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CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND ELECTORAL REFORM:
A FEMINIST ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE
KIMBERLY CHRISTENSEN
ABSTRACT
In "Campaign Finance and Electoral Reform: A Feminist
Economics Perspective," we begin by examining the impact of the
current regime of campaign finance on the American political
system, in terms of the possibilities for corruption, for inegalitarian
agenda-setting, and on the quality of representation by office-
holders. We then briefly review attempts to regulate this system,
from the Tillman Act of 1907 to the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act ("McCain-Feingold"). We examine and critique the
extant proposals for change, including legislation and/or regulation
to "plug the holes" in FECA (the Federal Election Campaign Act
of 1971), public financing of all federal campaigns (through either
lump-sum payments or "voter vouchers"), and the deregulation of
all campaign contributions, combined with immediate reporting of
the same. Next, using the work of feminist economist Amartya
Sen, we examine the proposals for reform through the lens of
feminist economics, critiquing the neoclassically based assumption
of individualistic political decision-making on which they are built.
We examine the reasons for the decline of "dialogic sites,"
institutions and venues where ordinary Americans can debate
politics, form coherent political world-views, and pressure
candidates and elected officials. Finally, using both the tools of
modem communications technology and lessons from the civil
rights and feminist movements, we present a tentative list of
proposals for reform and democratic renewal of the American
political system.
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CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND ELECTORAL REFORM:
A FEMINIST ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE'
"The two most important things in politics are
money and I can't remember what the other one
is."
2
I. The Current American Campaign Finance System:
Many observers have recognized the potential for conflict
between the market-based (and often profoundly unequal)
American economic system and the egalitarian aspirations of the
American electoral system. For example, as Bruce Ackerman and
Ian Ayres have commented:
Liberal democracy requires an awkward balance
between two spheres of life. Within the sphere of
democratic politics, we confront each other as moral
equals, and we deliberate about our collective
future .... The organizing principles of the liberal
market are different. We come to the table with
unequal assets, often vastly unequal. We bargain to
further our private interest, without trying to justify
our deals in terms of the greater public interest....
Our collective anxiety about campaign finance
testifies to the uneasy coexistence of the spheres.
3
Although nominally regulated, the current system of
American electoral finance relies heavily on private contributions
1 The author would like to thank Brian Glick (Fordham Law School), Thomas J.
Schwarz, President, Purchase College, State University of New York, Elaine
McCrate (University of Vermont, Economics), and Sanford Ikeda
(SUNY/Purchase, Economics) for their assistance. This piece is dedicated to the
memory of my father, Julien M. Christensen.
2 Representative Mark Hanna, Republican of Ohio, cited in Jason Conti, The
Forgotten Few: Campaign Finance Reform and Its Impact on Minority and
Female Candidates, 22 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 99 (2002).
3 BRUCE ACKERMAN AND IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW
PARADIGM FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE 12-13 (2002).
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to fund all manner of campaign activity, especially television
advertising. For example, in 2000, over three billion dollars of
private money was raised and spent on the presidential and
congressional elections, 4 and the estimates for the 2004 elections
approach four billion dollars. 5 According to the NYU Brennan
Center for Justice, the majority of this money goes towards the
purchase and design of television advertising, predominantly short
(and often negative) spot ads.6
This predominantly private funding regime presents several
fundamental problems for the democratic nature of the American
political system. These include:
1. Possibilities for quid pro quo corruption
First, given the enormous quantity of government procured
goods and services, private campaign financing presents myriad
opportunities for quid pro quo corruption. For instance, in 2000,
direct federal government spending was approximately two trillion
dollars, consumption and gross investment by the federal
government was over 590 billion dollars, and another, untold
amount of money was spent complying with federal
environmental, health and safety, and other regulations. Each of
these procurement and regulatory decisions was potentially
influenced by the possibility or reality of private campaign
contributions.
7
And, not surprisingly, there is evidence that deals between
4 Stephen Ansolabehere, John Figueiredo, & James Snyder, Why is There So
Little Money in US. Politics? 12 J. EcON. PERSP. 105, 105-110 (2003).
5 Glen Justice, Even with Campaign Finance Law, Money Talks Louder than
Ever, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2004, at 16. (noting that in the 2004 elections,
presidential campaigns spent over $900 million in private money alone). See
also Federal Election Commission (hereinafter "FEC") data, at www.tray.com
(last visited March 13, 2006).
6 See Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law, Campaign Finance and
Reform: Fact & Fiction, at
http://www.brennancenter.org/programs/buyingtime2000_facts.html (last visited
March 26, 2006).
7 See supra note 4.
2005-2006
Buffalo Public Interest Law Journal
candidates and special interests do occur. For instance, paperwork
filed in conjunction with the McConnell challenge to the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 20028 (hereinafter "McCain-
Feingold" or "BCRA") has revealed several cases of probable quid
pro quo deals. 9 One particularly egregious example concerns the
promise of a payoff the Republican National Committee demanded
in writing from drug giant Bristol-Meyers-Squibb in return for
legislation "that will benefit your industry."' 10 Such deals contain
the potential to undermine both the representative nature of
American democracy and popular faith in that system.
2. Possible impact on agenda-setting and prioritization
Quid pro quo deals are often cited as evidence in favor of
the "public choice" theory of politics." Briefly stated, public
choice theorists believe that information costs, combined with the
infinitesimal chance that ones vote will decide an election, will
lead most citizens to remain "rationally ignorant" about candidates
and electoral issues. 12 This allows small, committed groups 13 to
8 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, 2 U.S.C. 431 (2002).
9 See McConnell v. Federal Election Com'n, 540 U.S. 93, 124 S.Ct. 619 (2003).
'o Adam Cohen, Buying a High-Priced Upgrade on the Political Back-
Scratching Circuit, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2003, at A18. For an example of
possible quidpro quo deals regarding SEC shareholder access rules, see Public
Citizen's Congress Watch, Contributions and Paybacks: Corporate Cronies, at
http://www.citizen.org. For evidence regarding the impact of campaign
contributions on environmental policies, see Public Citizen's "Top US Air
Polluters are Closely Tied to Bush Fundraising, Pollution Policy-making
Process, at http://www.citizen.org.
11 Michael Fitts, Can Ignorance Be Bliss? Imperfect Information as a Positive
Influence in Political Institutions, 88 MICH. L. REV. 917, 917-82 (1990). See
generally JAMES BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF
CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962);
JAMES BUCHANAN, TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY (1980);
GORDON TULLOCK, ARTHUR SELDON, & GORDON L. BRADY, GOVERNMENT
FAILURE: A PRIMER IN PUBLIC CHOICE (2002).
12 Information has many of the attributes of a "public good"; i.e., that it is
impossible to exclude "free riders" (those who have access to the information
but who do not pay for it) and that the use of this information by the "free
riders" will not increase the costs of production of that information. Under these
circumstances, private markets will fail to produce adequate amounts of
information. See, e.g., Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the
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research relevant issues and, through lobbying and strategic
campaign contributions, to gain undue influence over government
decisions. In particular, public choice theorists believe that these
special interest groups will be able to successfully use the
legislative and regulatory processes to siphon public funds to their
members. 14 The resulting outcomes will be both inefficient and
incompatible with the public interest. Crude forms of this theory
actually present proposed legislation as a "product" to be "sold" by
legislators and "bought" by special interest groups.15
But despite the existence of some blatant quid pro quo
deals, empirical research casts doubt on simplistic public choice
models that view leislation as a market where bills are "sold to
the highest bidder."6 In other words, although such deals may
Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets, 70 AM. ECON. REv. 393, 395
(1980); George Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 2
(1961).
13 Small groups are assumed to have lower transactions costs; i.e., costs of
making use of information. Lower transactions costs are presumed make
research, communications, and lobbying more efficient, and hence, less costly.
14 Economists refer to this behavior as "rent-seeking."
15 See Einer Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive
Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L. J. 31, 31-2 (1991). It should be noted that not all
neoclassical economists are convinced of the theoretical or empirical validity of
public choice theory. For instance, Gary Becker argues that the dead-weight
costs (inefficiencies) of special interest legislation will eventually encourage
taxpayers to organize and resist. See Gary Becker, A Theory of Competition
Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 93 Q. J. ECON. 3 (1983).
16 In 1972, economist Gordon Tullock observed that if campaign contributions
are actually "investments" in government decisions, this is a market
characterized by an incredible gap between "investment" and "return." As we
have seen, in 2000, direct federal spending was approximately two trillion
dollars, and consumption and gross investment another 590 billion dollars, with
an unknown amount spent complying with federal regulations. Yet private
campaign contributions to all federal candidates, parties, and organizations
totaled three billion. While three billion is a significant sum, it represents an
insignificant percent of the supposed "market" for government contracts and
regulations. If campaign contributions were really "investments" in public
policy, competition among contributors should have forced private contributors
2005-2006
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occur, blatant congressional vote-buying does not seem to be the
norm.
To test the empirical validity of the public choice approach,
Ansolabehere, Figueiredo, and Snyder surveyed forty studies
which examined the relationship between PAC contributions and
congressional roll-call voting. They found that, "[o]verall, PAC
contributions show relatively few effects on voting behavior."'
17
Ansolabehere, Figueiredo, and Snyder recognize that equations
designed to measure the correlation between congressional voting
and contributions may be prone to "specification" problems.
Ansolabehere, Figueiredo, and Snyder therefore construct their
own model to attempt to disentangle these effects. In line with the
majority of the forty surveyed studies, their results show that a
congressperson's roll-call voting behavior is much more dependent
on the legislator's own ideology, his/her party affiliation, and
constituent preferences (interestingly, in that order) than it is on
campaign contributions.
to "invest" much larger sums, i.e., "The discrepancy between the value of policy
and the amounts contributed strains basic economic intuition." In other words,
Tullock's puzzle remains. See Ansolabehere, Figueirdo, & Snyder, supra note
4, at 105-11.
17 Stephen supra note 4. See also Christopher Magee, Campaign Contributions,
Political Decisions, and Election Outcomes: A Study of the Effects of Campaign
Finance Reform, Public Policy Brief (Levy Economics Institute, Position Paper
#64A) (2001); Janet Grenzke, PAC's and the Congressional Supermarket: The
Currency is Complex, 33 AMER. J. POL. SC. 1 (1989); Henry Chappell,
Campaign Contributions and Congressional Voting: A Simultaneous Probit-
Tobit Model, 64 REv. ECON. & STAT. 77, 77-83 (1982).
1s The two most likely are simultaneity and inadequate control variables.
Simultaneity is the idea that contributions may influence votes, but votes may
also influence contributions., while inadequate control variables means that
PACs may want to elect already-"friendly" legislators as well as influence their
votes.
19 See supra note 4; see also Stephen Levitt, How Do Senators Vote?
Disentangling the Role of Voter Preferences, Party Affiliation, and Senator
Ideology, 86 AM. ECON. REv. 425, 425-41 (1996). I am skeptical of the validity
of the proxies often used to represent "legislator ideology" in this and similar
studies. For example, Ansolabehere, Figueiredo, and Snyder rely on Steven
Levitt's work which attempts to empirically separate the roles of constituent
preferences, party affiliation, and representatives' ideology in the determination
Vol. XXIV
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Even assuming that quid pro quo deals are not the norm,
however, the money-saturated context in which all legislative and
policy-making wrangling takes place can have a profound impact
on which issues are put on the agenda in the first place, and on
which alternative solutions are considered to be politically
feasible. 20 Studies that focus strictly on congressional roll-call
voting miss the fact that most of the crucial decisions and
compromises concerning pending legislation (such as whether it is
even brought to the floor for a vote) are made in committees and in
other informal settings. 21
Quoting Daniel Lowenstein:
In reality, the influence of campaign contributions is
present from the start, and it interacts in the human
mind with other influences in an unfathomable but
complex dynamic. It affects the 'chemistry' of the
'mix' of the legislator's deliberations. It may or
may not affect the legislator's ultimate actions, but
setting aside the most flagrant cases, no one can be
sure, perhaps not even the legislator in question....
It is not that the entire legislative process or even a
great deal of it is corrupt; rather, it is that the
corrupt element is intermingled with the entire
process, in a way that cannot be isolated. 2
of senators' roll call votes. A closer look at Levitt's model, however, reveals a
fundamental problem: Levitt does not employ a direct proxy variable for
senatorial ideology (his most statistically significant independent variable).
Rather, his coefficient for senatorial ideology is a remainder term; i.e., that
variance left after the influences of voter preferences and party affiliation have
been removed. Since his coefficient for "ideology" could clearly be picking up
the impact of un-theorized, omitted variables, his interpretation of this remainder
term as the impact of ideology must be seen as merely conjectural.
20 See Daniel Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform: The Root of All Evil
is Deeply Rooted, 18 HOFSTRA L. REv. 301, 301-367 (1989).
21 Id. at 325.
22 Id.
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For this reason, rather than focusing on cases of actual or suspected
quid pro quo corruption, many observers find it more fruitful to
discuss campaign contributions using the traditional legal
discourse of "conflict of interest." 23 In court cases, it is customary
to take -institutional steps to minimize these potential conflicts of
interests or, if that is impossible, to disqualify a judge or other
participant from a process where his/her self-interest might be at
stake. Yet the current U.S. system of campaign finance expects
legislators and executives (and candidates for these offices) to
continually disregard their own self-interest (in being re/elected) in
order to serve the public interest. Given the current institutional
setting, it may be necessary for candidates, at least occasionally, to
"shade" their beliefs and their behaviors in order to survive the
campaign fund-raising process. Perhaps we need to question the
structure of a system that creates such pressures on our
representatives.
3. Possibility of unequal impact in the electoral and
legislative arenas
Third, even if quid pro quo corruption did not exist, and
legislators and candidates could somehow make decisions without
regard to their own chances for re/election, the wealthy would still
have much greater ability to elect candidates who favor their
priorities by virtue of their greater control over resources.
There is considerable evidence that American political
participation of many sorts - from voting to letter-writing, to
making campaign contributions - is related to income and
education level.24  For instance, a study by Public Campaign
25
found that in zip codes where the median per capita income was
under $10,000, there were eight contributions to federal campaigns
23 Id. at 301-367.
24 See Spencer Overton, But Some are More Equal: Race, Exclusion, and
Campaign Finance, 80 TEX. L. REv. 987, 994-5 (2002).
25 Public Campaign is an advocacy organization that favors public financing of
campaigns. For general information on Public Campaign, and an abbreviated
version of the study, see http://www.publicampaign.org. See also Spencer
Overton, supra note 24.
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per 10,000 residents. 26 In zip codes with median per capita
incomes closer to the national average (37% higher), residents
were three times as likely to contribute to federal campaigns as
were those in the poorer neighborhoods. 27 And finally, residents in
the wealthiest districts, with per capita incomes over 400% higher
than the poorest neighborhoods, were fifty-four times as likely to
contribute to federal campaigns as those in the poorest
neighborhoods. 28 Clearly, the candidates favored by those in the
poorest districts do not, in any meaningful way, have an "equal
chance" of being elected as those favored by their more wealthy
neighbors. Legal scholars who favor reform contend that this
situation contradicts the principle of "one person, one vote" which
is central to democracy.
Additionally, current-day income and wealth distribution
are not innocent of historic inequalities in terms of race, gender,
and other axes of discrimination. Past state-sponsored
discriminatory practices such as restrictions on property
ownership, exclusion from higher education, etc., combined with
the continued existence of less formal discrimination, have resulted
in women and/or people of color having lower average incomes
and even lower levels of average wealth. Therefore, they tend to
make fewer campaign contributions than their white and/or male
peers, and hence, have less influence on the outcomes of electoral
campaigns. For instance, people of color currently constitute
roughly 30% of the U.S. population, but were fewer than 1% of
those who contributed to federal electoral campaigns.
30
Says Overton:
[P]ast, state-mandated discrimination against racial
26 See id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 See Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, Th Constitutional Imperative and
Practical Superiority of Democratically Financed Elections, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
1160, 1162 (1994).
30 See supra note 24.
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minorities has shaped the current distribution of
property, which in turn hinders the ability of many
people of color to participate fully in a privately
financed political system. [S]peech markets treated
in the campaign finance context are not 'neutral' or
'fair,' btit are based on existing property allocations
that have been shaped by illegitimate factors such as
past discriminatory public policies. [Riacial
disparities in the existing campaign finance system
exacerbate racial disparities in the future allocation
of resources.
31
4. Possible impact on the quality of representation
The constant need to raise funds is an unrelenting source of
stress for candidates and office-holders, as it forces them to spend
time away from their (non-wealthy) constituents and from the
business of legislating. Former Pennsylvania Congressperson Bob
Edgar, who quit the House of Representatives rather than face
another re-election fund-raising cycle, said, "[e]ighty percent of
my time, eighty percent of my staff's time, eighty percent of my
events and meetings were fund-raisers. Rather than go to a senior
center, I would go to a party where I could raise $3000 or
$4000. ' '32
Vincent Blasi argues for the public financing of all
campaigns based on the effect of the current system on campaign
finance on candidates and office-holders. 33 Blasi believes that the
impact of fund-raising on candidates' time is so severe as to
undermine the constitutionally-ordained necessity for constituent
representation. "Legislators and aspirants for legislative office who
devote themselves to raising money round-the-clock are not, in
31 id
32 See supra note 29, at 1188 (quoting Former Pennsylvania Congressperson
Bob Edgar)
33 Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of Fund-Raising: Why
Campaign Spending Limits May Not Violate the First Amendment After All, 94
COLUM. L. REv. 1281, 1283 (1994).
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essence, representatives.
'
"
34
The "money chase" almost certainly reduces the number of
qualified people willing to run for public office, and, as
Congressperson Edgar's comments make clear, it negatively
impacts on the ability of all officeholders to perform the jobs for
which they were elected.
II. Attempts at Regulation
Concern with these possibilities - for quid pro quo
corruption, conflicts of interest, undue influence, and the impact on
officeholders - has long led U.S. muckrakers and progressive
policy-makers to try to regulate the interaction between the private
contribution market and the public voting booth.35 Back in 1907,
under pressure from the Populist Movement, the U.S. Congress
passed the Tillman Act 36 which attempted to ban corporate
contributions to political campaigns. However, since Tillman
contained no effective enforcement mechanism, corporations
simply began to "launder" their contributions through their
executives, directors, and employees. 37 Since Tillman, there have
been numerous other attempts to rein in the influence of money on
elections. These include the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of
1925,38 the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971, 39 and
several sets of Watergate-inspired amendments to FECA, including
those of 1974, 1976, and 1979.4o The amended FECA originally
provided for strict limitations on both private campaign
34 Id.
" For a succinct summary of these attempts at regulation, see supra note 29, at
1160. See also CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM: A SOURCEBOOK (Anthony
Corrado, Thomas Mann, Daniel Ortiz, Trevor Potter, & Frank Sorauf, eds.,
1997).
36 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1907). See also supra note 29.
37 Id.
38 2 U.S.C. §§ 241-248 (1925).
39 2 U. S. C. § 441a(d)(3) (1971).
40 See supra note 29. For a summary of FECA amendments, see also CAMPAIGN
FINANCE REFORM, supra note 35.
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contributions and expenditures by candidates' campaign
committees.41
Since the 1974 amendments to FECA, the income tax
check-off system has provided for public financing of American
presidential campaigns. In return for raising a threshold level of
private contributions and a pledge not to raise further private
funds, presidential candidates can receive public funds to conduct
their campaigns, including the hiring of staff and the purchase of
television ad time. Several states and localities, including
Massachusetts, Maine, Vermont, Arizona, and New York City,
have adopted some variant of this system for their state/local
elections.
Unfortunately, due to the lack of indexing of the subsidies,
the real value of presidential public financing has been
significantly eroded since 1974, and the system has become
increasingly irrelevant. For instance, by the fall of 2003,
presumptive Republican presidential candidate George W. Bush
had already declared his intent not to participate in the public
finance system.43 Similarly, Democratic contenders Howard Dean
and John Kerry both announced that they would not be accepting
44public funding for their primary campaigns.
In addition, subsequent Supreme Court decisions and
rulings by increasingly conservative Federal Elections Commission
(hereinafter "FEC") commissioners have considerably weakened
the original intent of FECA and permitted the growth of end-runs
around funding limits. 45 Buckley distinguishes between the FECA
41 See supra note 35.
42 See, e.g., Arizona Citizens Clean Election Act, 16 A.R.S. § 952 (2005); Maine
Clean Election Act, 21-A M.R.S. § 1121 (1996); Vermont Clean Election Law,
17 V.C.E.L. § 2801 (2005); New York City Campaign Finance Act, N.Y.C.
Admin. Code § 3-701;_Massachusetts Clean Elections Law, 55B M.G.L. § 12
(1998), http://www.mass.gov/ocpf/clelec.htm (repealed 2003).
43 See Shrinking from Campaign Reform, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2003, at A26.
"Sharon Theimer, Kerry Raises $500,000 Online in Two Days, WASH. POST.,
January 30, 2004, at A6, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
d Y/articles/A60848-2004Jan29.html (last visited on March 26, 2006).
See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612 (1976), Nixon v. Shrink
Missouri, 528 U.S. 377 (2000); Cal. Med. v. F.E.C., 453 U.S. 182 (1981).
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limitations on campaign contributions, which it upheld as
necessary to prevent "corruption and the appearance of
corruption," and limitations on campaign expenditures, which it
overturned as a violation of First Amendment freedom of speech. 46
Subsequent Court decisions have reaffirmed and strengthened this
distinction between the supply of, and demand for, campaign
funds.
47
The predictable result has been the proliferation of end runs
around the original FECA limits. Three of the most troublesome
results are the growth of soft money, PAC bundling, and
independent issue/express advocacy
In 1978, the FEC explicitly allowed national political
parties to raise soft money (money not subject to FEC contribution
limits) from individuals, corporations, and PACs, for purposes of
party-building efforts such as voter registration drives, get-out-the-
vote (hereinafter "GOTV) campaigns, and the like. Since the mid-
1980s, as the specter of Watergate faded from public view,
national parties have begun to funnel this soft money into the
coffers of presidential candidates, including those who were
publicly funded and therefore supposedly operating under strict
limits on private contributions and campaign spending. A study by
the Brennan Center for Justice found that:
Based on FEC data, in the 2000 campaign, just
8.3% of soft money spent by the Republican and
Democratic Parties went to voter education, phone
46 See Buckley, supra note 45, at 26.
47See, e.g., Nixon, supra note 45 (upholding a Missouri statute that imposed
strict contribution limits on candidates for state office); Cal. Med., supra note 45
(1981 (upholding restrictions on contributions to PACs on the grounds of
preventing corruption); But cf F.E.C. v. N.C.P.A.C., 470 U.S. 480 (1985),
(overturning FECA limits on PAC expenditures as a violation of the First
Amendment); Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC
("Colorado I"), 518 U.S. 604, 608 (1996) (shielding "independent" expenditures
by the national political party from FECA limits).
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banks, voter registration, get-out-the-vote drives,
and other party-building activities. The party spent
38% of their soft money - far and away the largest
expenditure - on issue advocacy (television, radio,
and direct mail).48
Bundling is the process by which political action
committees (PAC's) and other special interest groups solicit
individual hard money (FEC-regulated) contributions for a
candidate, and then deliver them to that candidate in a bundle,
thereby taking credit for raising the donations. For example, "You
are now receiving $100,000 in individual contributions, courtesy of
the National Rifle Association." Since the individual hard money
contributions funneled by the PACs do not exceed the FECA limits
for individual donors, they do not violate the letter of the FECA
law. However, one could certainly argue that they eviscerate its
spirit.
In one particularly blatant example of bundling, George W.
Bush's 2000 and 2004 re-election campaigns created special
"clubs" for supporters who bundle large numbers of contributions.
Bush bundlers who raised at least $100,000 got to join the
"Pioneers"; those who raised $200,000 or more were "Rangers"
(presumably named after the sports team Bush once owned), and
those who raised $300,000 or more were "Super-Rangers" or
"Mavericks." 49 By July 2003, there were eighteen "Rangers" and
numerous "Pioneers."' 0 By Election Day 2004, there were 221
"Rangers" 327 "Pioneers," and 62 "Mavericks." 51 Together, these
bundlers raised approximately $77 million for George W. Bush's
re-election campaign.
52
48 See supra note 6.
49 Campaign Money Flows Amok, Editorial, N. Y. TIMES, July 8, 2004, at A20.
50 David Firestone, Bush Loyalists Compete for Spots on President's A-Team by
Raising Record Money for 2004, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2003, at A 10.
51 Id
52 Texans for Public Justice, Who are the Bush Rangers and Pioneers? Summary
and Key Findings, at www.tpj.org. A complete list of Bush's "Pioneers" and
"Rangers," along with their occupations/positions, industry affiliations, and
amounts bundled, is available at www.WhiteHouseForSale.org.
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Independent issue/express advocacy refers to advertising
that clearly opposes or supports a candidate, mounted in the period
immediately preceding an election by supposedly independent
advocacy groups (such as the Sierra Club, National Right to Life,
etc.). Since non-party-connected advocacy groups are not subject
to FECA contribution or expenditure limits, this type of advertising
(some of it quite defamatory) is a growing factor in many electoral
contests. A study by the Brennan Center for Justice found that
issue ads and supposedly independent expenditures accounted for
over 20% of the election-related advertising.
53
Since Buckley,54 the Supreme Court has used a "magic
words" test to determine whether a given ad is, indeed, advocating
the election of a particular candidate and should therefore be
subject to FECA regulations.55 But, only about 10% of candidates'
own campaign ads contain any of the Supreme Court's "magic
words."5 Clearly, this test leaves room for the growth of campaign
advertising by supposedly independent, supposedly grassroots
organizations.
III. Public Dissatisfaction and the Prospects for Change
As the end-runs around contribution and spending limits
have grown, and the number of attack ads increased, so has public
dissatisfaction with the American electoral process. Considerable
evidence exists of widespread disenchantment with the way
Americans finance and run electoral campaigns. 57
53 Jonathan Krasno & Daniel Seltz, Buying Time: Television Advertising in the
1998 Congressional Elections (1998) at 3.
54 See supra note 45.
55 Id. (noting magic words could include, for example, "Vote for Candidate X!"
or "Elect Candidate Y!")
56 See Brennan Center for Justice, supra note 6.
17 Gordon Black, The Politics ofAmerican Discontent. Black, Table 3 (1992), at
76, cited in Fred Wertheimer & Susan Weiss Manes, Campaign Finance
Reform: A Key to Restoring the Health of Our Democracy, 94 COLUM. L. REv.
1126, 1126-59 (1994).
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Poll data consistently reflect skeptical-to-cynical attitudes
towards elected officials.58 A survey conducted in 1992 by the
Gordon Black organization found that 74% agreed with the
statement that "[c]ongress is largely owned by the special interest
groups." Similarly, 83% agreed that "the special interest groups
that give campaign contributions to candidates have more
influence over the government than the voters," and 85% agreed
that "special interest money buys the loyalty of candidates." 9
Perhaps more troubling are the statistics regarding
American voter participation. As Curtis Gans has pointed out, the
polarizartion of the electorate and extensive voter mobilization
drives pushed voter turnout in the 2004 federal elections to
approximately 59.6% (120.2 million people), the highest level
since 1968.60 This was up considerably from the 2000 presidential
election, when only 54.3% (105.4 million people) voted, and from
1996, when only 49% (95.8 million people) voted. 6' Still, a 60%
voter participation rate in one of the most hotly contested elections
in the past century hardly constitutes a ringing endorsement of our
electoral system. Turnout for off-year congressional elections is
much lower, averaging less than 39% in 1994, approximately 36%
in 1998, and just over 39% of eligible voters in 2002.62
These figures are even more disturbing when placed in an
international context. The Institute for Democracy and Electoral
Assistance compared countries' voter participation rates since
1945 (or whenever the countries began holding elections) and of
the 172 countries studied, U.S. voter turnout rate ranked 1 1 4 th.63
Nearly every industrialized democracy ranked ahead of the United
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Curtis Gans, President Bush, Mobilization Drives Propel Turnout to Post-
1968 High, Committee for the Study of the American Electorate 12 (2004),
available at http://www.fairvote.org/CSAEelectionreport.pdf.
61id
62 See Center for Voting and Democracy, Voter Turnout,
http://www.fairvote.org/?page=262 (last visited April 15, 2006).
63 See International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), at
http://www.idea.int/vt/survey/voter-tumoutpop2-2.cfm (last visited March 13,
2006).
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States, including Italy, at 92.5%; Denmark at 83.6%, Germany at
80.6%, Spain at 77.0%, the United Kingdom at 74.9%, Japan at
69.0%, and France at 67.3%. The U.S. voter turnout rate was
similar to that of many severely under-developed countries and/or
countries which have recently experienced intense political turmoil
or election-related violence, such as Uganda at 50.6%, Peru at
48.0%, Nigeria at 47.6%, El Salvador at 44.3%, and Haiti at
42 .9%.64
There is also significant evidence of broad-based support
for change in the American campaign finance system. First,
witness the surprising strength of John McCain's campaign for the
2000 Republican presidential nomination, a campaign he based
primarily upon the issue of campaign finance reform. Despite an
enormous financial disadvantage -- by July 1999, George W. Bush
had raised 36 million dollars compared to McCain's three million
dollars -- McCain beat Bush in the early primary states of New
Hampshire, Michigan and Arizona. 65 In March, on Super Tuesday,
however, McCain "hit a wall.,,66 His traveling-bus approach was
not able to compete with the well-financed television advertising
64 Id. It should be noted that discrepancies exist in how countries measure voter
turnout. For example, the US calculates turnout by comparing the number who
voted with the number of potential voters, while many European countries
compare the number who voted to the number registered to vote. However,
since voter registration rates in most European countries are over 90%, the
resulting discrepancies are unlikely to invalidate the comparison regarding voter
participation. Interestingly, the Institute found that voter turnout rates do not
correlate strongly with either average years of formal education, though basic
literacy had some positive effect, or with GDP per capita. Two factors were
strongly correlated with turnout: the UN's HDI (Human Development Index)
which includes measures of civil liberties and press freedom, and the
competitiveness of the electoral system, as measured by the narrowness of the
margin of victory of the winning party.
65 See supra note 3, at 166.
66 See id. at 165-167. "Super Tuesday" is the day of thirteen simultaneous
primaries, primarily in the South.
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blitz of the Bush campaign.6 7 Nevertheless, McCain's early
victories sent a message to the Bush campaign, and later to the
Bush White House. Despite having spoken publicly against
campaign finance legislation, such as that advanced by McCain
and Feingold, President Bush signed the "McCain-Feingold Act or
"BCRA" in 2002.68
Second, witness the surprisingly strong, bipartisan support
for the McCain-Feingold Act itself. Although problematic, it
nonetheless represents a recognition of the depth of the problems
in the American regime of campaign finance. Partly as a result of
McCain's nomination bid, a significant number of Republicans
were able to break from their party's leadership and endorse this
legislation. 69 Having passed the House by a margin of 340 to 289,
the bill passed the Senate by a margin of 60-40, with eleven
Republicans voting in favor.
70
Third, witness the passage of "clean money" public
financing laws in several states, including Maine, Vermont,
Massachusetts, and Arizona, and similar public financing of local
campaigns in several cities and localities, including New York
City.7
1
Last, witness the increasingly vocal dissent to America's
electoral finance system, even from some in the business
community. For instance, prior to the passage of the McCain
Feingold Act, the Committee for Economic Development, an
organization of business leaders and educators, released the results
of a poll of 300 senior executives from major firms with annual
revenues of $500 million or more.72 Seventy-eight percent of the
executives polled agreed that "the current campaign finance system
has spawned an arms race for cash" that is increasingly "out of
67 See id.
68 See supra note 8.
69 See Alison Mitchell, Vote is 60 to 40: Opponents of Measure Say They Push
Battle into Courts, N. Y. TIMES, March 21, 2003, at A-], A-34.70Id.
71 See supra note 42.
72 See Committee for Economic Development, Corporate Executives Polled on
Campaign Finance System, at www.ced.org/cfrpollfactsheet.pdf (last visited
April 1, 2006).
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control., 73 Sixty-six percent agreed that the "burdens of fund-
raising" have "reduced competition" in congressional elections and
"diminished the number of qualified candidates for federal
elections." 74 And while three-quarters admitted that political
contributions gave them an advantage in shaping legislation, over
half also reported that they feared the legislative and/or regulatory
consequences if they refused to donate to the campaigns of high-
ranking political officials.75 Perhaps as a result, sixty percent of the
executives surveyed supported a ban on all soft money
contributions, sixty-six percent supported voluntary spending
limits for federal campaigns, and more surprisingly, fifty-three
percent supported a publicly-funded system of matching funds for
small campaign contributions of under two hundred dollars.
76
Clearly, there is widespread and far-reaching dissatisfaction
with the current American system of electoral finance. We need to
rethink this conflict-fraught relationship between the egalitarian
aspirations of otir electoral system and our market-based economic
system which generates such widespread inequalities.
In the remainder of this article, we will examine several
proposals recently enacted or currently being debated in the
law/public policy literature for changing the American system of
campaign finance. These proposals include legislation to plug the
FECA loopholes, the public financing of campaigns, either via
lump sum subsidies or via citizen vouchers, and the deregulation of
all contributions and expenditures, combined with increased
disclosure requirements. This list is by no means exhaustive, but
rather is meant to be suggestive of the types of proposals currently
extant in the literature. Following brief comments on the specifics
of each proposal, we will examine all of the proposals through the
lens of feminist economics. For although the reform proposals vary
73 Id.
74 id.
75 Id.
761d
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widely, all are ultimately based on an individualistic, "law and
(neoclassical) economics" approach to political decision-making,
and on the ideology of a "separative self' so scathingly critiqued
by feminist economists. Using the work of Amartya Sen, we will
explore what it might mean to view the political process from a
feminist economics perspective, i.e. bearing in mind the
importance of unpaid family and community labor, and the
centrality of economic and political interdependence. We will
briefly explore the causes of the decline of institutions supporting
community-based political debate. Finally, we will examine
several feminist-economics-based proposals for reform. These
proposals use the insights of participatory citizen movements such
as civil rights and feminism, along with tools of modem
communications technology, to increase the possibilities for
democratic renewal.
IV. Current Proposals for Reform
The current proposals for reform of the American system of
campaign finance fall into four basic categories:
1. "Plugging the holes" in the current regulatory
regime.
77
2. Public financing via direct subsidies to
candidates' campaigns. 78
3. Mixed (public/private) systems: Public
financing via contribution vouchers with blind
donation booths for private donations. 7
9
4. Total deregulation of contributions and
expenditures, combined with immediate
reporting.
8 0
77 See, e.g., "McCain-Feingold," supra note 8,
78 See, e.g., Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 29.
79 See, e.g., ACKERMAN &AYRES, supra note 3.
80 See e.g., Samuel Isaacharoff & Pamela Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign
Finance Reform, 77 TEX L. REV. 1705, 1705-38 (1999); Kathleen Sullivan,
Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 663, 664-690
(1997).
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Many of the assumptions underlying these proposals vary widely.
For example, what are the underlying problems with the American
system of campaign finance? Is it quid pro quo corruption, the
undue influence of the wealthy or of certain racial/gender groups,
and/or the lack of low-cost, reliable informatibn on candidates and
issues? Additionally, what is the best mechanism for dealing with
the underlying problems? What is the proper relationship between
government and the market in the realm of campaign finance. Is it
direct government regulation of private donations and
expenditures, government subsidies to candidates, or market-based
reform mechanisms? Similarly, what are the underlying
assumptions regarding the optimal distribution of information? Is
political information best distributed directly to individuals or via
groups such as political parties? Which media most efficiently and
equitably distribute political information? And finally, what is the
underlying vision of what well-functioning democracy looks like?
To what extent are equal rights in the political sphere compatible
with the increasingly inegalitarian American economic system? As
we shall see, the proponents of the various approaches to reform
hold dramatically differing views on these and other basic
questions.
1. "Plugging the Holes ": The Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act of 2002 ("McCain-Feingold")
The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 200281 is the most
recent attempt to plug the holes in the existing FECA-based
regulatory regime for federal campaign finance. This legislation
contains three major provisions:
a. Soft money: Prohibits any national political party from
receiving or spending any soft money whatsoever. State
and local political parties are permitted to raise and spend
s See supra note 8.
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up to $10,000 annually for voter registration and GOTV
efforts.
8 2
b. Hard money: Increases the limits on an individual's
contributions to a given candidate from $1000 to $2000
annually, and indexes this limit to inflation. It also
increases the amount an individual can give in a two-year
election cycle, from $50,000 to $95,000, and indexes this
limit to inflation.
83
c. Issue ads/Express advocacy: Prohibits corporations, unions,
and nonprofit organizations from paying for express
advocacy advertising that refers to a specific candidate for
thirty days before a primary, or sixty days before a general
election. Instead, payment for such advertising must come
only from hard money contributions to the candidates'
campaigns.
84
Proposal-specific critiques:
Proponents of McCain-Feingold hope that the bill's
provisions will help to shore up the beleaguered FECA regulations
that have been weakened by Supreme Court and FEC decisions,
and by the proliferation of end runs around FECA limitations on
contributions and expenditures. In this way, supporters of BCRA
hope to restrain the influence of special interests on the country's
electoral process and its governance.
During the debate over Shays-Meehan, the companion bill
to the Senate's McCain-Feingold, John Lewis (D-GA) said that:
Now is the time for us to do what is right. It is time
to remove the corrupting influence of soft money on
the political process. It is time to open up the
political process and let the average person come in
and participate. It is time to let all of our citizens
have an equal voice.
85
82 Id. at § 101.
83 Id. at §§ 212-214.
84 Id. at §§ 201-204. This legislation defines "express advocacy" in terms of the
"magic words test." (quoting language from Supreme Court decisions such as
Buckley v. Valeo, supra note 45).
85 See Excerpts from the House Debate on the Shays-Meehan Campaign Finance
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BCRA is a well-intentioned and long-sought attempt to rein in
some of the worst abuses of the current American system of
campaign finance. However, serious drawbacks exist to this
approach to reform. First, opponents of BCRA argue that such
regulation will simply cause political money to shift from more
accountable national political parties to less accountable state
parties and advocacy organizations. 86 They also argue that BCRA
will deny American citizens, via their unions and nonprofit
organizations, their constitutionally-protected rights to free
speech.87 Led by Senator Mitch McConnell (R-KY), opponents of
BCRA filed a "Buckley challenge" to its constitutionality based
largely on First Amendment grounds.
88
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of McCain-Feingold and
upheld its constitutionality. 89 However, there is reason to believe
that at least some of the opponents' objections may have merit. For
instance, even while the Court was hearing the McConnell
challenge to the BCRA, moneyed interests were already finding
Bill, March 21, 2002, N.Y. TIMES, at A34.
86 See Isaacharoff& Karlan, supra note 80, at 1706-08.
87 Joseph Sandier, Fordham Law School Seminar, McCain-Feingold: Is It
Promoting or Destroying Democracy? February 5, 2004. This debate involved
Deborah Goldberg, Democracy Program Director at the Brennan Center for
Justice, New York University School of Law, Joseph Sandier, of law firm
Sandler, Reiff, & Young, and Stanley Zalen, Chief Enforcement Counsel, New
York State Board of Elections. Jerry Goldfeder, Moderator.
88 See McConnell, supra note 9.
89 Id. (holding that "Congress's legitimate interest . . . extend[s] beyond
preventing simple cash for votes corruption to curbing 'undue influence on an
officeholder's judgment and the appearance of such influence," especially
through the "manner in which parties have sold access to federal candidates and
officeholders). Relying on an extensive factual record of post-Buckley end-runs
around FECA, the court found soft money and electioneering communications
to be "loopholes" which BCRA attempts to narrow through means "reasonably
tailored to the task."
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new ways to funnel funds into political campaigns.9 ° The New York
Times reported on the increasing use of nonprofit, tax-exempt,
election-related organizations (hereinafter "527's") that funneled
over $400 million to presidential and congressional candidates in
the 2004 elections.91 527's were particularly active in support of
Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry, spending over $188
million on his campaign. 92 After two days of hearings in April
2004, the FEC decided not to attempt to regulate 527's prior to the
November 2004 presidential election, though they held out the
possibility of future regulation.93 Similar use of 501(c)(3)'s,
another form of non-profit, tax-exempt organization, has also been
reported.94 Clearly, this process of loophole-plugging will be a
constant struggle for advocates of this approach to reform.
A second concern for opponents of BCRA is that its new
funding restrictions and filing requirements may disproportionately
impact on those with fewer resources, such as grassroots groups
and third party candidates who cannot afford full-time lawyers and
accountants. 95 This would be a troubling result from legislation
designed to reduce the impact of economic inequality on the
political process.
Similarly, some progressives worry about the impact of
BCRA on traditionally-marginalized candidates.96 Jason Conti
points out that women and/or people of color usually enter the
campaign process as challengers rather than as incumbents. 97
Incumbency confers on a candidate enormous advantages, from
90 Glen Justice, Concerns Grow About Role of Interest Groups in Elections, N.
Y. TIMES, March 9, 2005, at A20.
91 id
92 Michael Janofsky, Advocacy Groups Spend Record Amount in 2004 Election,
N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2004, at A3 1.
93 FEC Hearings on Regulating 527's (C-SPAN television broadcast, April 14-
15, 2004).
94 NOW: The PBS Weekly Newsmagazine (PBS television broadcast, January
11, 2004) (Bill Moyers interviewing Chuck Lewis from the Center for Public
Integrity).
95 See Sandier, supra note 89.
96 See, e.g., Conti, supra note 2, at 99-161.
97 Id.
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greater visibility in the media, to the ability to respond to
constituents' requests, and to franking privileges.98 Indeed, in the
2002 midterm elections, 98% of congressional incumbents running
for re-election were returned to office99 Given this incumbency
advantage, challengers generally need to amass much larger war
chests to defeat current office-holders.10° Traditionally, women
and/or people of color candidates have relied for this financial
support upon national parties and/or ideologically-driven PACs
0l
'
both of whose influence will be greatly reduced by the BCRA.
Additionally, as Conti and Overton point out, the increased "hard
money" contribution limits will be less beneficial to these
candidates, whose contributors generally have lower income
levels. 102 In short, if BCRA is strictly enforced, we need to be
certain that it would not act as an additional "incumbency
protection system" for predominantly wealthy, white male office-
holders.
Finally, the express advocacy portions of BCRA do raise
some troubling First Amendment questions. For example, do we
want to support legislation that prohibits Planned Parenthood or
the Feminist Majority Foundation from buying television time
right before an election to inform voters about the pro- or anti-
choice positions of the candidates? Do we want to prohibit the
Sierra Club from buying ads to publicize the positions of
candidates on "new source review" in the Clean Air Act? Are we
98 The "franking privilege" grants an elected official the right to send mail
through the postal system for free, often simply by signing his or her name
where the postage stamp would normally be placed.
99 See supra note 94.
'0 See Conti, supra note 2, at 98. Some believe that if BCRA is strictly
enforced, only those who have substantial name recognition and/or who can
self-finance their campaigns, will be able to successfully challenge incumbents.
See Interview with Thomas J. Schwarz, President, Purchase College, State
University of New York. (March 25, 2004).
1o1 See, e.g., Emily's List, www.emilyslist.org. Emily's List is a political
network that supports pro-choice Democratic women candidates.
102 See, e.g., Conti, supra note 2; Overton, supra note 24.
2005-2006
Buffalo Public Interest Law Journal
not troubled by campaign legislation that acts to limit (rather than
expand) access to information? Shouldn't our goal be to find a way
to equalize political power from the bottom up rather than from the
top down, by providing greater access to information, opinion, and
debate?
2. Public financing of campaigns via direct subsidies to
candidates:
As we have seen, the 1974 amendments to FECA provided
an income tax check-off system for the public financing of
American presidential campaigns. Jamin Raskin and John Bonifaz
and many reform organizations 10 3 advocate the indexation of the
presidential campaign subsidies, the expansion of this system to
federal congressional campaigns, and legislation (such as the
BCRA) to tighten the current loopholes in FECA. 104
Like many other reformers, Raskin and Bonifaz believe
that the debate over campaign finance reform must not be framed
in terms of the "free speech rights" of the wealthy and special
interest groups. 10 5 Rather, it should be formulated in terms of "a
paradigm of equal protection," i.e., the right of all citizens,
regardless of wealth, to participate meaningfully in the campaign
and electoral process. 10 6 This equal protection framework is based
on Supreme Court rulings responding to the Civil Rights
Movement of the 1960s, which struck down impediments to
electoral participation, such as poll 'taxes 10 7 and exorbitant
1' See, e.g., Public Citizen, at http://www.citizen.or- (last visited April 2, 2006)
(a non-profit watchdog organization founded by Ralph Nader) and Common
Cause, at http://www.commoncause.or- (last visited April 2, 2006) (a non-profit
organization focusing on an open, honest government).
104 See supra note 29, at 1160-1203.
105 id.
10 6 See supra note 29.
10 7 See Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (striking
down Virginia's poll tax, and holding that "a State violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment whenever it makes the affluence of the
voter or payment of any fee an electoral standard. Voter qualifications have no
relation to wealth.").
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candidate filing fees. 108 Raskin and Bonifaz also cite civil rights-
era court decisions which require equal treatment of citizens in
reapportionment cases on Fourteenth Amendment grounds.' 
09
Like most others who support the public financing of
campaigns, Raskin and Bonifaz argue for a system of public
subsidies given directly to the candidates' campaign committees.
110
To qualify for such funding, a candidate would be required to raise
a large number of small (e.g., $5) "qualifying contributions" from
his/her district/state. In addition, prior to the primary, the candidate
would be allowed to solicit private "seed money" in $100 amounts
for start-up costs, such as paying workers to solicit qualifying
donations, setting up an office, etc. Assuming that s/he collected
the required number of qualifying donations and agreed not to
accept further private donations, s/he would then receive a one-
time grant, equal to that of every other publicly funded candidate,
for the primary election. Those candidates who survive the primary
would then receive a subsequent grant for the general election. In
addition, if candidates who chose not to participate in the public
funding program out-spend the publicly-funded candidate(s),
Raskin and Bonifaz propose that publicly-funded candidates
receive supplemental matching funds to equal the expenditures of
their privately-funded competitors. To ensure that soft money and
other end-runs do not undermine the integrity of their scheme,
Raskin and Bonifaz support strict, McCain-Feingold-type limits on
108 See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972). In Bullock, the Court struck
down the high filing fees that Texas required of all primary candidates, saying
that such fees have a "patently exclusionary character" that eliminated from
competition "potential office seekers lacking both personal wealth and affluent
backers."
109 See, e.g., Wesbury v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533 (1964); cf Shaw v Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). See also Terry Smith,
Race and Money in Politics, 79 N.C. L. REV 1470, 1470-1522 (2001) (pointing
out that the Supreme Court has been less than consistent in applying this one-
person-one-vote standard when it comes to race). See supra note 29.o See supra note 29.
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soft money, bundling, and express advocacy. Finally, like many
advocates of campaign reform, Raskin and Bonifaz advocate
granting free, or reduced-cost, television time to all candidates. I"'
Proposal-specific critiques:
The expansion and strict enforcement of public financing
could significantly reduce the possibilities for quid pro quo
corruption and undue influence-peddling. It could open up the
electoral process to candidates from a greater range of
income/wealth classes and those with non-mainstream views. And
public financing contains the possibility of significantly reducing
special-interest-induced "pork-barrel spending." In fact, Raskin
and Bonifaz believe that, over time, this reduction in "pork" would
pay for the public financing program.l 2
However, the direct subsidy approach raises its own
questions of equity and fairness. On the one hand, if the qualifying
thresholds are set too high, the number of candidates is reduced
and the goals of inclusivity, access, and open debate are
compromised. On the other hand, if the qualifying thresholds are
too low, you end up with the California recall election of 2003, not
to mention a significant expenditure of tax dollars. Therefore, the
levels at which the thresholds are set becomes a crucial, and
politically charged, question.
Basing current subsidies on the past performance of parties
and candidates, not on their current popularity, can lead to
troubling results. For instance, the strong showing of Ross Perot's
Reform Party in the 1996 presidential election allowed the Reform
Party to automatically qualify for public funding in 2000.'13 By
2000, however, Ross Perot and his followers no longer controlled
the Reform Party. 14 Instead, a well-orchestrated campaign by Pat
Buchanan enabled him to capture the presidential nomination of
the virtually moribund Reform Party and its public funding."15 Pat
111 See id.
112 See id.
113 See supra note 3, at 167.
114 See id.
115 See id.
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Buchanan and his sister and campaign manager, Bay Buchanan,
used that $12.5 million in public funds to advance their own ultra-
conservative agenda, an agenda far removed from that of the 1996
Reform Party.
116
The one-size-fits-all nature of the subsidies presents
another potential problem. For instance, under Raskin and
Bonifaz's plan, Green Party presidential nominee Ralph Nader or
the Reform Party's Pat Buchanan would receive equal public
funding and equal air time with the more-democratically-
nominated Republican and Democratic presidential and
congressional candidates. As long as subsidies are based on
minimum threshold standards, these problems will persist.
Last and most important, as Raskin and Bonifaz's support
for BCRA makes clear, public financing is not a one-shot deal; it
requires constant monitoring and loophole-plugging legislation to
maintain its integrity and intent. 1 7 At some point, this loophole-
plugging may begin to threaten the freedoms of expression and
debate in ways that are troubling to even the most committed
campaign finance reformer.
3. A Mixed System: Publicly-Financed Contribution
Vouchers and "Blind Donation Booths"
Partly in response to criticisms leveled at other public-
finance schemes, Bruce Ackerman and Ian Ayres advocate a mixed
(public/private), market-based campaign finance system."18 In
116 Id. See also The American Reform Party, at http://www.americanreform.org
(last visited on April 1, 2006); The Reform Party USA, at
http://www.reformparty.org (last visited on April 1, 2006).
17 See supra note 29.
118 See supra note 3. See also Bruce Ackerman, Crediting the Voters: A New
Beginning for Campaign Finance, 4 AMER. PROS. 13, Mar. 21, 1993 (defining
"patriot dollars); Ian Ayres and Jeremy Bulow, "The Donation Booth:
Mandating Donor Anonymity to Disrupt the Market for. Political Influence," 50
STAN. L. REv. 837 (1998) (defining the "donation booth" or" blind trusts").
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particular, they propose publicly funded contribution vouchers (i.e.
"Patriot dollars") for all citizens, combined with "blind trusts" for
private campaign contributions.'19 In so doing, they hope to
combine what they see as the flexibility and decentralization of
market mechanisms with the egalitarianism of publicly funded
campaigns. They believe that their system would retain the
expressive value of private campaign contributions while ridding
those contributions of their worst corrupting influences. In
addition, they hope to avoid the threshold issue, the one-size-fits-
all subsidy, and other problems associated with traditional public
financing systems.
While the Ackerman/Ayres' scheme is complicated, in
brief, they advocate that every registered American voter be given
$50 in FEC-generated credit, known as Patriot dollars, to be used
only for contributions to federal campaigns. 120 The credit would be
imprinted onto people's pre-existing ATM cards and would be
divided into allocations for presidential, senatorial, and
representative races and further divided into primary and general
election components; (e.g., $15 for presidential primary, $15 for
the presidential general election, and $20 divided among the other
federal races). Citizens would donate their Patriots to the
candidates of their choice at FEC-designated ATMs. Ackerman
and Ayres hope that these Patriot dollars would become the
primary mechanism for funding federal campaigns. In fact, their
plan would instruct the FEC to issue additional Patriot allocations
if the ratio of Patriots to private funding fell below two-to-one. 
1 21
Ackerman and Ayres' Patriot allocations would be
supplemented by a secret, or "blind" donation booth for private
campaign contributions. Any candidate, political party, or PAC
that wanted to receive donations of public Patriot dollars would be
required to set up a "blind trust" at an FEC-approved financial
119 See Ackerman, supra note 120. For a variation on the Ackerman/Ayres plan,
and a discussion of its political and philosophical bases, see Edward Foley,
Equal Dollars per Voter: A Constitutional Principle of Campaign Finance, 94
COLUM. L. REv. 1204 (1994).
120 See supra note 3, at 182.
121 Id. at 82.
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institution.122 Individuals would then be free to make private
contributions to this candidate's trust, but the checks would be
made out not to the candidate, but rather, to the financial institution
where the candidate had his/her blind trust. The financial
institution would then funnel these private donations to the
appropriate candidate, party, or PAC's trust account. The financial
institutions would make weekly reports to candidates regarding
their financial positions and would publish lists of donors to the
various campaigns. However, they would only be permitted to
report donation amounts up to $200. Ackerman and Ayres believe
that this secret donation booth, which they liken to the secret
voting booth, would "ambiguate" the information signals needed
for quidpro quo to take place. 123 For instance, anyone could claim
to have made a $100,000 contribution to candidate X last week,
but proving it would be difficult since the canceled check would be
made out to a bank, not to the candidate. By rendering secret the
amounts and sources of campaign contributions, Ackerman and
Ayres hope to greatly reduce the possibilities for "pork,"
corruption, and other special interest dealings. 124 Like Raskin and
Bonifaz, they believe that this reduction in special-interest
government spending could eventually 2pay for the cost of the
publicly-funded portion of their system. 1
Ackerman and Ayres' Patriot/donation booth system would
be overseen by a newly constituted FEC, consisting of retired
federal judges serving for ten-year, non-renewable terms. 126 In this
way, they hope to reduce the politicization of the FEC and make it
less vulnerable to pressure from incumbent presidents, legislators,
and others.
122 Id. at 183.
123 Id. at 28.
124 Id. at 25.
125 Id. at 91.
126 Id. at 185.
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Proposal-specific critiques: 127
If implemented as proposed, Ackerman and Ayres' mixed
system would provide many advantages over the current
arrangement. Their secret donation booth would greatly increase
the cost of the information needed for effective quid pro quo
corruption and could result in a reduction in campaign
contribution-motivated government spending. Their Patriot plan
would reduce many of the problems of current public financing
proposals, including the qualifying threshold problem, and the
ethically ambiguous one-size-fits-all lump-sum grant. It would
eliminate such public-funding absurdities as Pat Buchanan's
capture of the 2000 Reform Party's $12.5 million in public
funding.' 28 The Patriot scheme would give citizens a small
incentive to investigate and discuss candidates and issues pursuant
to spending their Patriot dollars. Because it renders secret, but does
not limit, private donations, Ackerman and Ayres' proposal should
be immune to a Buckley challenge on freedom-of-speech and
related constitutional grounds.
129
Despite its many laudatory aspects, there are serious
problems with Ackerman and Ayres' mixed system proposal. First,
the mechanisms required to maintain the viability of the Patriot
ATM system and (especially) the secrecy of the donation booths
are labyrinthine in the extreme. For example, to make it impossible
for a donor to signal a candidate, and the candidate to confirm, that
s/he had just made a major contribution to that candidate's
campaign, the blind trust financial institutions would be required to
deposit donations into candidate accounts in accord with a
complicated mathematical algorithm.' 30 The FEC would be
required to constantly monitor the public/private mix of campaign
contributions and to periodically adjust citizens' Patriot
allocations, the spending of which would require another trip to the
127 But see Richard Briffault, Reforming Campaign Finance Reform: A Review
of Voting with Dollars, 91 CAL. L. REv. 643 (2003) (offering a thoughtful and
balanced critique of the Ackerman/Ayres plan).
129 See supra note 3, at 185.
129 See supra note 45.
1
30 See supra note 3, at 227-231.
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FEC-designated ATM. Due to the problem of no start-up funds,
Ackerman and Ayres' scheme includes a separate set of rules for
start-up funds, with bonus Patriot allocations, determined by
another complicated formula, for those who spend their Patriots
early.' 3 ' The plan would necessitate the passage and strict
enforcement of anti-fraternization laws between candidates and
those employed at financial institutions sponsoring blind trusts. In
short, the mechanisms of this entire process would not be open and
accessible to the average American, rendering participating
institutions vulnerable to charges - valid or not - of incompetence
or corruption. This is not the way to increase Americans'
understanding of and participation in the democratic processes of
government.
Second, in the wake of the scandals involving Arthur
Andersen and other trusted American financial institutions, it
seems naive in the extreme to place the fate of our political system
partly in their hands, via their control over the secret donation
booths. Questions arise, such as whether they could they be trusted
to conscientiously allocate campaign contributions, not to report
major donations to favored candidates, and to remain neutral even
if, for example, one candidate is advocating economic regulations
that would adversely affect their industry. Unlike Ackerman and
Ayres, I am not convinced that selective ignorance can indeed be
constructive in the realm of campaign finance.
Third, Ackerman and Ayres' entire scheme rests centrally
upon the impartiality of their newly constituted FEC, composed of
retired judges. 3 2 Given the concerns surrounding the 2000
Supreme Court decision in Bush v. Gore, some may question the
impartiality of even our highest-ranking judges. Given that the
Ackerman and Ayres plan would dramatically increase the power
of the FEC, it is doubtful whether Americans of any political
persuasion would be willing to turn over so much power to a small
'3 See supra note 3, at 83.
132 See supra note 3 at 67-69.
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panel of presidentially-appointed ex-judges.
Fourth, there is an inherent tension in the Ackerman/Ayres
plan between access and cost. Patriot allocations must be sufficient
to provide a real incentive to citizens to investigate candidates and
issues, and to go to the trouble of registering their ATM, and
spending their Patriots. But if Patriot allocations are sufficient to
provide serious incentives to behavior change, they begin to
constitute a substantial, long-term drain on the federal budget. This
is a serious issue for a system that is built upon broad citizen
participation. 133
Fifth, as stated above, participation in the Patriot system
would require registering ones ATM card, and then using that card
to make Patriot donations. 134 Those without ATM cards could go
to Patriot-approved banks and apply for special cards, but this
would require a very significant commitment of time and
energy. 135 Given that ATM cards are much more commonly used
in higher-income communities, it is reasonable to question whether
Patriot contributors, like voters in general, will be more well-off,
better-educated, and more likely to be white than the general
citizenry. The equity impact of using public funds to multiply the
electoral impact of those with above-median incomes raises serious
questions of equity and undermines the intended democratic
impact of the plan.
133 See Guy-Uriel Charles, Mixed Metaphors: Voting, Dollars, and Campaign
Finance Reform, 2 ELECT L. J. 271, 271-283 (2003) (pointing out that
participation in the Patriot system would involve considerable effort on the part
of the voter, i.e. registering ones ATM card, researching candidates' positions,
and voting ones Patriot dollars. "The continuing decline in voter participation
rates cast serious doubt on the viability of any voucher scheme as a sustainable
long-run solution to the problems of private campaign finance"). See also
Daniel Farber, Dollars and Sense: A 'New Paradigm'for Campaign Finance
Reform, 37 U RICH L. REV. 979, 979-1010 (2003); supra note 29, at 643-684.
Ackerman and Ayres estimate of $5 billion in Patriot contributions assumes
Patriot participation rates roughly similar to voter participation rates in general
elections. But if Patriot participation rates were closer to primary election
participation rates (approximately 34% in 2000), the Patriot system would yield
less than $1.8 billion in public campaign financing. See supra note 3, at 67-69.
134 See supra note 3.
135 Id.
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Finally, Patriot dollars, like school vouchers, pollution
credits, food stamps, Section 8 housing vouchers, and other
voucher programs, essentially involve the creation of a parallel
money supply to ameliorate the increasing inequalities of wealth
and power in American society. As we know from our experience
with these other programs, voucher systems sometimes carry
unintended and unforeseeable consequences. Examples include the
creation of pollution hot-spots in many low-income
neighborhoods, and the phenomenon of better-prepared students
"vouchering out" of resource-poor neighborhood schools, leaving
the remaining children even worse off. 136 It is unclear whether yet
another market-based voucher program, this time affecting basic
American democratic institutions, would be more successful at
addressing political inequality than other voucher programs have
been at ending hunger, homelessness, environmental degradation,
and inferior educations. Perhaps, rather than attempting to create
yet another market-based end-run around inequality, we should
begin to ask ourselves more basic questions about the mechanisms
which create and sustain so much inequality in the first place.
4. Total Deregulation with Immediate Disclosure
The constitutional and practical difficulties of regulating
campaign finance in the context of Buckley have led some to
advocate the total deregulation of campaign finance, i.e., an end to
all limits on both campaign contributions and expenditure,
combined with stricter, often internet-based, disclosure
requirements. 137 It would then be left up to the media and
opposition candidates to investigate possible connections between
campaign contributions and legislative or executive decisions, and
136 See, e.g., Felicity Barringer, New Hampshire Senate to Vote on Approach to
Mercury Rule, N. Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2005, at A14, and Matthew Yglesias, The
Verdict on Vouchers, 15 . AM. PROSPECT 2, Feb. 2004, at
http://www.prospect.org/print/V15/2/yglesias2.html (last visited on April 22,
2006).
137 See Sullivan, supra note 80, at 668.
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up to voters to punish errant officeholders at the next election.
Samuel Isaacharoff and Pamela Karlan believe that the
wealthy will always find innovative end-runs around new
campaign finance restrictions. 138 Given the enormous costs of
television .advertising, and its demonstrated effectiveness,
candidates will continue to need to raise large sums of money, and
wealthy individuals and corporations will continue to find ways to
give it. 139 Rather than stanching the flow of funds, Isaacharoff and
Karlan believe that increased regulation will only drive political
money away from national political parties towards advocacy
groups and other independent expenditures, which are less
traceable, less accountable, and less transparent than political
parties. 140 In addition, they point to the troublesome constitutional
and practical dangers, such as selective enforcement, raised by
restricting political speech through the regulation of independent
advocacy expenditures.1 4 1 Last, along with Kathleen Sullivan
142
and Daniel Ortiz,143 Isaacharoff and Karlan assert that many
campaign reformers hold an unspoken assumption that the majority
of Americans are "civic slackers" who do not spend enough time
investigating candidates and issues, and whose ignorance allows
them to be unduly influenced by attack ads.144 They find this
assumption to be deeply inegalitarian and anti-democratic. 
45
In addition to supporting the deregulation of contributions
and expenditures, Isaacharoff and Karlan also advocate several
measures to change what they call the "eco-system" of voting, the
institutional context in which electoral decisions are made and
enacted. 146 For instance, they advocate on-site, Election Day, and
138 See Isaacharoff & Karlan, supra note 80, at 1705-38.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id
142 Sullivan, supra note 80.
143 Daniel Ortiz, The Democratic Paradox of Campaign Finance Reform, 50
STAN. L. REv. 893, 893-902 (1998).
144 See Isaacharoff & Karlan, supra note 80.
14S Id.
146 Many of their proposals would reduce what economists call the "opportunity
costs" of electoral participation, including costs both monetary and non-
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online voter registration; voting online or by mail; and the
expansion of poll hours to multiple days, including weekends,
when fewer people are working. 147 They urge serious consideration
of proposals, such as those advanced by Lani Guinier,14 8 to change
our winner-take-all electoral system to one of proportional
representation. 4 9 Finally, they recommend the reconsideration of
policies that have the effect of protecting incumbents, such as
power over congressional reapportionment, and the franking
privileges given to incumbents but not to challenger candidates.
50
Proposal-specific critiques:
Many of Isaacharoff and Karlan's critiques of the current
eco-system of voting are insightful and deserve serious
consideration. For instance, simplifying the process of registration
and 'Voting would be particularly helpful to those,
disproportionately women, whose child- and/or elder-care
responsibilities make it difficult to get to polling places.
More basically, Isaacharoff and Karlan, along with Sullivan
and others, raise serious and troubling questions concerning the
ability of moneyed interests to circumvent new regulatory regimes
and of the unintended consequences of loop-hole-closing
legislation. 151 They remind us that we must tread carefully when
we regulate political speech, even in the interests of a more
egalitarian democratic process.
monetary of choosing one course of action over another. For example, the true
cost of a college education includes not only the tuition books, housing, etc., bit
also the opportunity cost of the lost wages one could have earned had one not
been attending college.
147 See Isaacharoff& Karlan, supra note 80.
148 See generally LANI GUINIER & STEPHEN CARTER, THE TYRANNY OF THE
MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE (NY: FREE PRESS
1995) (1987).
149 See Isaacharoff & Karlan, supra note 80.
150 id.
151 See Sullivan, supra note 80.
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With that said, there are serious problems with the
deregulate-and-disclose approach. First, as Richard Briffault points
out, disclosure advocates may be a bit naive about the willingness
and/or ability of the major media to research, comprehend, and
publicize in a timely manner the impact of campaign contributions
on the behavior of candidates and elected officials. 152 During the
2000 electoral cycle, "[v]ery few newspapers allocated even one
reporter's time to the analysis of campaign finance documents."'
153
And television networks, from which most Americans get the
majority of their campaign information, generally devoted even
less time to campaign finance and its impact on congressional and
presidential decision-making. 154 This disclosure process is further
complicated by the fact that the influence of contributions is often
not discernible in simple roll-call votes; rather, they influence
agenda-setting, prioritization, and other, less visible aspects of the
legislative process. 155
An alternative to media disclosure of ties between
contributions and candidates' positions/behaviors is disclosure by
opposition candidates. But as contributions increasingly flow not
to official campaigns, but to express advocacy groups and others
who are not required to disclose their contributors and finances,
even opposition candidates may find it increasingly difficult to
obtain the information necessary for effective disclosure. Given all
of these complications, it seems highly unlikely that the media and
campaign competitors will be able to hold the candidates' "feet to
the fire" as disclosure advocates assume. 156 In other words,
152 Supra note 29, at 643-84.
153Michael Malbin and Thomas Gais, The Day After Reform: Sobering
Campaign Finance Lessons from the American States (1998), cited in Richard
Briffault, supra note 29, at 653.
154 See THOMAS PATTERSON, DOING WELL AND DOING GOOD: How SOFT NEWS
AND CRITICAL JOURNALISM ARE SHRINKING THE NEWS AUDIENCE AND
WEAKENING DEMOCRACY 3-4 (2000). As Thomas Patterson has pointed out, the
growth of "soft news" and "infotainment" has exacerbated this problem. From
1980 to 2000, "public affairs stories decreased from 70 percent of news
coverage to 50 percent."
155 See supra note 20.
156 See Sullivan, supra note 80.
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deregulate- and-disclose is unlikely to address citizens' concerns
with the impact of money on politics.
Second, Isaacharoff and Karlan, Sullivan, Ortiz and others
are clearly wrong when they accuse reformers of believing that
American voters are slackers. 157 Realistically speaking, it is highly
unlikely that any one person's vote will decide an election,
particularly in an election for a state or national office.
Furthermore, the process of procuring candidate/issue information
and taking the time to vote can involve significant opportunity
costs. In other words, it is perfectly rational for a citizen to devote
minimal amounts of time and energy to researching candidates and
to making electoral decisions. But, as economists have also
recognized since the time of Keynes, the sum of rational individual
micro decisions does not necessarily lead to optimal macro
outcomes. 158 Individual voter rationality can very well lead to
falling participation rates and an increasingly undemocratic
political system. It is therefore perfectly macro rational for the
citizenry to take measures to ensure the continuing health of its
political system, either by reducing the cost of information and/or
voting to the electorate, and/or by taking more direct regulatory
measures. Although one can certainly disagree with specific
proposed reforms, the impetus for reform implies neither citizen
irrationality nor reformer condescension.
V. Further Critiques of Current Proposals for Campaign Finance
Reform
In addition to the specific difficulties of the individual
proposals, two foundational, problematic assumptions are made by
157 See, e.g., Isaacharoff& Karlan, supra note 80, at 1727.
158 This is part of what is known as the "disequilibrium" interpretation of
Keynes, the idea that the market needs occasional "correcting" by democratic-
government intervention. See generally JOHN M. KEYNES, THE GENERAL
THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY (1936); AXEL
LEIJONHUFVUD, ON KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS AND THE ECONOMICS OF KEYNES
(1968).
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most proponents of reform, including many advocates for the
public financing of campaigns. First is the assumption that the
American airwaves rightly belong to the television-broadcasting
corporations that use them, and that airtime for candidates and for
disseminating electoral information should be purchased from
these broadcasting corporations at significant public and/or private
expense. Second is the assumption that the campaign advertising
that the public would be financing (via subsidies or vouchers)
would enhance the quantity and quality of electoral information
and democratic debate. We will examine each of these assumptions
in more detail.
1. Who owns the airwaves?
As we have seen previously, the purchase of television
airtime, and the purchase of talent to design advertisements for that
airtime, now comprises the majority of American campaign-related
expenses at all but the local level. 59 Indeed, more equal access to
the airwaves is one of the goals of most public finance proposals.
But a seventy-plus year history of legislative mandate and
judicial case law has established that the American public owns the
airwaves and that the broadcast corporations use this public
resource at the discretion of the American public. The federal
government's involvement in the broadcasting market stems from
the physical reality of spectrum scarcity, the limited number of
potential radio and television frequencies, which results in a
"natural oligopoly."' 160
The original, deregulated approach to radio frequencies,16 .
codified in the Radio Act of 1912, resulted by the mid-I 920s in
a cacophony on the airwaves, which interfered with reliable signal
159 See supra note 6.
160 Monopoly refers to one seller in a given industry; oligopoly refers to a few
firms. Monopoly or oligopoly can result from a "natural" or imposed resource
scarcity (e.g., spectrum scarcity or government-enforced patents), or when
significant economies of scale are present. Economies of scale exist when larger
outputs result in lower per-unit costs, which allows larger firms to produce at a
lower cost and to "price compete" smaller firms out of the market.
161 47 U.S.C. § 51 (1912).
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capture and thwarted the commercial potential of radio
broadcasting. In the ensuing debate over how best to manage this
physically limited, and potentially immensely profitable, resource,
labor, religious, and educational leaders argued for a "common
carrier" model; i.e., nondiscriminatory access to the airwaves for
any individual, group, or organization willing and able to pay for
the airtime. Broadcasters, on the other hand, argued that they could
best develop audience consistency and profitability via tighter
programming and editorial control. 162, The Radio Act of 1927163
and the Communications Act of 1934,164 (still the legal charter for
American radio and television broadcasting), rejected the
"common carrier" model and affirmed the "free speech" rights of
broadcasting corporations. In return for virtually free access to
radio and television frequencies, 165 licensees were statutorily
required to operate "in the public interest, convenience, and
necessity."' The Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld this public
interest basis of broadcasting regulation as constitutional. 67
The exact content of these public interest obligations has,
of course, been the subject of much debate and compromise, as
evidenced by the FCC's repeated regulatory attempts at public
interest programming guidelines and the changing requirements for
license renewal. In 1929, the Federal Radio Commission, which
later became the FCC, issued the "Great Lakes Broadcasting
Guidelines," which required licensees to maintain "well-rounded"
162 See Advisory Committee on the Public Interest Obligations of Digital
Television Broadcasters, Charting the Digital Broadcasting Future: The Final
Report of the Advisory Committee on the Public Interest Obligations of Digital
Television Broadcasters 32-4 (1998) (hereinafter "Advisory Committee").
163 47 U.S.C. § 29 (1927).
'64 47 U.S.C. § 201 (1934).
165 The F.C.C. charges only minimal processing fees for broadcasting licenses
166 47 U.S.C.§ 231 (effective Oct. 1, 1982).
167 See, e.g., Nat'l Broad Co. v. United States, 39 U.S. 190 (1943); Red Lion
Brands v. Fed. Communication Comm'n, 395 US 388, 389 (1969) (upholding
the FCC's powers over the broadcast industry and upheld the public interest
standard as a legitimate response to frequency scarcity).
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programming, and listed the types of programming which would
be required for license renewal. 168 These included religious
programming, education and instruction, "matters of interest to all
members of the family," and music, "both classical and lighter
grades."' 69 In 1946, the FCC issued the "Blue Book," which
further specified the criteria the FCC would employ in assessing a
station's public interest obligations, including an emphasis on local
programming, public affairs programming, limitations on
advertising, and attention to "niche" audiences.' 7 ° In 1960, the
FCC issued its Programming Policy Statement, which listed
fourteen specific elements necessary to meet public interest
requirements.' 7 ' Among these fourteen necessary elements were
political and public affairs programming, children's programming
and programming of interest to minority groups.
With respect to stations' public interest obligations
regarding electoral information, in the early 1970s, Congress
enacted the lowest-unit-rate (hereinafter "LUR") rule, which
stipulated that broadcasters must offer airtime to political
candidates at the lowest rate applicable to that day, time, and
market in the period immediately preceding an election. 172
Although broadcasters have complained that the LUR regulations
are bureaucratic and burdensome, they are still in effect. 173
The 1980s brought about a marked change in the
composition and goals of the FCC. Deregulation became the
watchword, and the FCC eliminated not only the content
regulations for public interest programming, but even record-
keeping requirements for most stations.17 4 License renewal was to
occur, in most cases, via postcard rather than after a lengthy
examination of the station's public interest service.175 And the FCC
168 GREAT LAKES BROADCASTING Co., 3 FRC ANN. REP. 929 (1998), in
Advisory Committee, supra note 162.
169 Id.
170 For an explanation of the "Blue Book," see supra note 162, at 22-23.
171 Id. at 23.
172 The Communications Act, 47 U.S. C. § 312(a)(7)(1934).
173 See supra note 162, at 57.
174 Supra note 162, at 24.
175 id.
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abolished most aspects of the Fairness Doctrine, the requirement to
present all sides of an issue fairly, as incompatible with
broadcasters' freedom of speech. 1
76
The 1996 Telecommunications Act 177 (hereinafter "the
Act") built on this deregulatory approach, lengthening the period
between license renewals from five to eight years, making it even
more difficult for the FCC to deny license renewal requests, and
increasing the number of stations a given broadcasting corporation
could own. In addition, Section 201 of the Act gave away the new,
digital (HDTV) spectrum, valued at over $70 billion, to existing
licensees "to facilitate the transition from analog to digital
television."' 178 This was justified on the basis of the new
investments in equipment and in operational changes that would be
necessary for the transition. Several Senators from all parts of the
political spectrum, including conservatives such as John McCain
and Bob Dole, and progressives such as Barney Frank and Paul
Wellstone, spoke out strongly against this spectrum give-away.'
79
Instead, they favored measures that would auction off the new
digital spectrum, with the money being used to pay for expanded
educational and public interest programming. But, under intense
lobbying pressure from the broadcast industry, specifically the
National Association of Broadcasters (hereinafter "NAB"), the
spectrum auction alternative was soundly defeated.18
0
Attempts to require free airtime for candidates, strongly
opposed bY the NAB, have also been repeatedly defeated in
Congress. According to the Congressional Research Service,
between 1960 and 2000, one-hundred-sixty-three bills demanding
176 Id.
17747 U.S.C. 228 (1996).
178 Id. at § 201.
179 David Denison, Don't Mess with Television: Al Gore Wants TV to Help
Reform Elections. Congress and the Broadcast Lobby Gave Other Ideas, AMER.
PROSPECT June 5, 2000, at 37.
18o Id.
181I id.
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free or reduced-rate airtime for candidates were introduced into
Congress. 182 The BCRA originally contained a provision for free
airtime for all candidates who qualified for public financing.
However, due to intense lobbying by the NAB, this provision had
to be dropped before then-House Majority leader Trent Lott would
agree to bring the bill to the floor. 183 Even the minimal
recommendations for five minutes of free airtime nightly for
debates prior to elections were opposed by the majority of
broadcasters on the Committee.1
84
Dissenting from the Committee's tepid recommendations
for five minutes nightly of free airtime for political debates, Robert
Dechard, of the Belo Corporation, which owns the Dallas Morning
News and seventeen television stations, Harold Crump, of Hubbard
Broadcasting, and William Duhamel, of Duhamel Broadcasting,
stated that:
Broadcasters should be encouraged to consider, on
a voluntary basis, a broad range of programming
and other options to help elevate political discourse.
(Emphasis added) This should not be mandated by
the Federal Government; it can and should be a
voluntary standard agreed to and promoted by the
industry and its leading members.85
In short, the entire regulatory approach to broadcasting has
supposedly been based upon a quid pro quo agreement: private
broadcasting corporations receive virtually free access to an
immensely profitable, scarce public resource in return for agreeing
to serve the public interest. But as digital technology dramatically
increases the value of that resource, and as the public interest
obligations of broadcasters become increasingly attenuated under
the mantle of deregulation, perhaps it is time to rethink this entire
approach.
The public financing of all federal campaigns, whether by
candidate subsidy or citizen vouchers, could definitely increase
182 See supra note 179, at 34.
183 Id. at 37.
114 See supra note 162.
.
85ld. at 82.
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access to the airwaves for less-well-funded candidates and could
help to level the political playing field. But, from an economics
perspective, public financing amounts to a substantial subsidy (to
the tune of billions of dollars in every election cycle), in
perpetuity, to private, profit-making broadcast corporations. Given
that the 1996 Act already granted this industry virtually free access
to the new $70 billion digital spectrum, 186 perhaps we need to
replace the public interest quid pro quo with a more consistent
approach. That is, either we believe in the virtues of the free,
unregulated market, in which case the federal government should
auction off leases to the public's airwaves (with the money being
used to subsidize unprofitable public interest programming) OR we
believe that natural oligopolies should be regulated. In this case,
broadcasters must be forced, on condition of license renewal, to
truly serve the public interest via the enforcement of "must carry"
rules for educational, electoral and other programming. An
industry should not be permitted to avoid the market when it suits
them, (e.g., the give-away of the digital spectrum), and then appeal
to the sanctity of that same market when faced with reasonable,
minimal regulatory obligations. In other words, the American
people should not have to pay again for what they already own.
Quoting former FCC Chair Newton Minow:
Digital broadcast licenses should not be awarded
without a broadcaster's explicit commitment to
provide public service time in campaigns and not
sell time. We now have a colossal irony. Politicians
sell access to something we own: our Government.
Broadcasters sell access to something we own: our
public airwaves. Both do so, they say, in our name.
By creating this system of selling and buying
access, we have a campaign system that makes
good people do bad things and bad people do worse
things, a system that we do not want, that corrupts
116 Id. at 91.
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and trivializes public discourse, and that we have
the power and the duty to change.'
8 7
A play-or-pay approach to the broadcast industry would drastically
change the economics of the entire campaign finance debate.
Either via auction revenues or must-carry regulations, play-or-pay
would open up vast new possibilities for a host of election-related
educational programming. The content of this programming will
be discussed further in the next section. I would argue, however,
that the American public has a right to adequate low-cost electoral
information to further democratic debate via our national medium
of television.
2. What exactly are Americans being asked to pay for?
In addition to ignoring questions of the economics and
obligations of the broadcast industry, most proposals for reform
tend to overlook an even more basic question; that is, what exactly
would be purchased with this increased public (or private/public)
financing? And would these increased expenditures actually
increase debate and improve the democratic nature of the
American political/electoral system?
As we saw above, most funding for federal campaigns is
used for the production and airing of television advertising, much
of it short, often negative, and emotionally-laden attack ads.188 As
Sullivan has pointed out, these ads must be successful at helping
candidates to win elections, or campaigns would not continue to
pay millions of dollars to produce and air them. 189 And, in a
context where information is opportunity-costly for voters to
acquire, and the chances that ones vote will decide an election are
extremely small, it is perfectly rational for individuals to remain
"rationally ignorant" about candidates and issues and, hence, to be
more easily swayed by emotionally-laden appeals.
But although attack ads can be useful in winning elections,
increasing the number of people who can afford to run an
' See id. at 93.
188 See Sullivan, supra note 80.
189 ld.
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increasing number of attack ads would not necessarily improve the
democratic nature of the American political system. Instead, attack
ads, rather than being part of the solution to our electoral troubles,
may represent part of the problem. Attack ads, and the negative,
scandal-driven political culture they spawn, may marginally
increase voters' information about competing candidates.
However, the primary long-run impact of this "Willie Horton-
ization" of campaigns may be to increase voters' cynicism about
all candidates, all government, and about the democratic process in
general. In my opinion, increasing public (or private) funding for
more 30-second, slick spots will not contribute substantially to
democratic debate. Rather, it will only induce Americans to hit the
mute buttons on their remotes even more often - and to go the polls
even less often. 1
9 0
More basically, the lack of attention to what is being paid
for is a symptom of the individualistic, "law and (neoclassical)
economics" approach to political information, debate, and
decision-making, an approach which underlies virtually the entire
debate on campaign finance reform. While many campaign finance
reformers would disagree with the policy prescriptions and anti-
government-"intervention" orientation of law and (neoclassical)
economics, their analyses and proposals are nonetheless
profoundly shaped and constrained by that perspective. This is
particularly apparent in the pervasive assumption that political
information is collected and weighed, and electoral decisions are
made, by isolated, atomized individuals.
19
'
90The evidence regarding the impact of negative campaigning on voter turnout
is mixed. However, the results of one study support the hypothesis that ads that
are perceived by potential voters to be "negative" are associated with
statistically significant reductions in voter participation rates. See STEPHEN
ANASOLABEHERE & SHANTO IYENGER, GOING NEGATIVE: How POLITICAL
ADVERTISEMENTS SHRINK AND POLARIZE THE ELECTORATE (1995). Contra
Richard Lau & Gerald Pomper, Effects of Negative Campaigning on Turnout in
US Senate Elections, 1988-1998, 5 J. POL. 63 (2001).
191 See Isaacharoff & Karlan, supra note 80, at 1723-24.
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From the perspective of neoclassical economics, the
democratic electoral process is essentially one of a "market for
votes," where atomized individuals collect candidate and issue
information and make electoral decisions in order to maximize
their individual, self-interested utilities. 192  The utility the
consumer/voter derives from the widget/candidate is unrealistically
presumed to be exogenous to the "market" for widgets/candidates
and is also unrealistically not influenced by the widget-/candidate-
derived utility of other consumers/voters. The "rational"
consumer/voter will research information on widgets/candidates
until the marginal cost (including the opportunity cost) of
obtaining more information roughly equals the marginal benefit of
additional widget/candidate info. S/he will then choose the best
combination of widgets/candidates to maximize his/her individual
utility subject to his/her budget and time constraints. 193 The
process of political decision-making, then, is merely a process of
finding the optimal aggregation of these pre-existing, utility-
maximizing preferences of individuals.
Feminist economists have devastatingly critiqued the
cultural, political, economic, and psychological assumptions
underlying this model of human behavior. 194 We have called for a
'92 In economic theory, utility is defined as the pleasure or usefulness a
consumer derives from the consumption of a good, service, etc. Hence, in
theory, one could derive utility from another's well-being. However, in practice,
utility maximization is assumed to correspond to ones individual consumption of
goods and services.
193 Utilities are maximized subject to budget and time constraints. In the long
run, it is assumed that if one is unhappy with one's budget constraint, one can
choose to work more hours and obtain more income. Note that this assumes that
one can always get a job, i.e., that there is always full employment.
194 For further information on feminist economics and its critique of the
androcentric class and race biases of neoclassical economics, see Julie Nelson,
The Study of Choice or the Study of Provisioning? Gender and the Definition of
Economics, in MARIANNE FERBER & JULIE NELSON BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN:
FEMINIST THEORY AND ECONOMICs 23-36 (1993). See also Paula England, The
Separative Self Androcentric Bias in Neoclassical Assumptions, in MARIANNE
FERBER & JULIE NELSON BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN: FEMINIST THEORY AND
EcoNoMics 37-53 (1993); Paula England, Separative and Soluble Selves:
Dichotomous Thinking in Economics, in MARIANNE FERBER & JULIE NELSON
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more complex model of homo economicus, one that recognizes the
existence of both selfish and altruistic motives in both the public
and private spheres, and which questions that very division. We
have called for an economics that recognizes the existence and
crucial importance of unpaid caring labor to the health and
continued functioning of families and communities, and ultimately,
of national economies. And we have also called for a more
complex model of the political process than the simple aggregation
of supposedly exogenous preferences which characterizes law and
(neoclassical) economics.195
VI. Towards a Feminist-Economics Theory of the Political
Process: The Work ofAmartya Sen
As opposed to a neoclassical perspective, a feminist
economics theory of social choice is based upon a much more
complex vision of the relationship between the individual and the
group. People involved in a social decision-making process will
necessarily evaluate choices, public policies, and social outcomes
from a variety of locations and perspectives. In what Marianne Hill
calls the "matrix" of social identity and domination, each
individual may belong to and/or identify with a gender, a sexual
identity, a family, a racial/ethnic group, a community, a geographic
region, a country, a profession or job, a firm or industry, a union or
other workplace organization, a religious organization, various
community organizations, a political party or movement, sports
teams or hobby groups, and many others markers of social
BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN: FEMINIST THEORY AND ECONOMICS (1993); Dianna
Strassmann, Not a Free Market: The Rhetoric of Disciplinary Authority in
Economics, in MARIANNE FERBER & JULIE NELSON BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN:
FEMINIST THEORY AND ECONOMICS 54-68 (1993); Amartya Sen, Gender and
Cooperative Conflicts, in IRENE TINKER, PERSISTENT INEQUALITIES: WOMEN
AND WORLD DEVELOPMENT 123-49 (1990); and AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT
AS FREEDOM (1999).
1' See SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM, supra note 194.
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location. 196 The lived reality of each of these groups will differ,
leading to different perspectives, different epistemologies
197
Elizabeth Anderson and others have identified part of the
task of moral and political philosophy as developing and
evaluating strategies for coming to terms with these evaluative/
epistemological differences based on positional variations. The
approaches to this problem are widely divergent. 198 For instance:
1. Positional differences as sources of bias to be
eliminated.
Many non-feminist philosophers and liberal social theorists
consider these local perspectives to be merely sources of error and
bias. 199 They strive to eliminate them where possible, or to reduce
them to a minimal number, usually two: the "self-interested" and
the "universal., 20 0  Rawls, for instance, attempts to deduce the
universal by forcing social choices from behind a "veil of
ignorance," only after attempting to abstract from social position
entirely.20 1 As feminist philosophers have made clear, however,
this attempt to construct a "view from nowhere" often ends up,
reconstructing the "view from the dominant" and thereby
reinforces social inequality and oppression.
202
196 Marianne Hill, Development as Empowerment, 9 FEMINIST ECON. 117, 117-
36 (2003).
197 Id.
198 See Elizabeth Anderson, Sen, Ethics, and Democracy, 9 FEMINIST ECON.
239-61 (2003). See also IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF
DIFFERENCE (1990) AND IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY
(2000).
9 See id.
200 Anderson, supra note 198, at 240.
201 See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
202 See, e.g., Susan Bordo, Feminism, Postmodernism, and Gender-Scepticism,
in LINDA NICHOLSON, FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM (1990). See also Sandra
Harding, Rethinking Stendpoint Epistemology: What is Strong Objectivity?, in
LINDA ALCOFF & ELIZABETH POTTER, FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGIES (1993);
Sandra Harding, Feminism, Science, and the Anti-Enlightenment Critiques, in
LINDA NICHOLSON, FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM (1990); SANDRA HARDING, THE
SCIENCE QUESTION IN FEMINISM (1986); and Donna Haraway, Situated
Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial
180 Vol. XXIV
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2. Positional differences as inevitable; Radical
individuality:
Neoclassical economics, on the other hand, declare the
impossibility of constructing anything but intensely local
perspectives. Its subjective measures of utility are so local that
they cannot even be compared between individuals in the same
family. Given this strong assumption, neoclassical social
evaluation is reduced to finding the optimal agregation of these
(supposedly exogenous) individual preferences.
Development economist Amartya Sen and other feminist
economists believe that these radically subjective measurements of
utility are inadequate to the task of evaluating social well-being. 205
First, preferences are adaptable, as people tend to adjust
psychologically to chronic deprivation, pain, oppression and/or206
ignorance. For instance, if an individual has no hope of attaining
a valued function (e.g., learning to read), or will be punished by
others for attempting to attain that function, s/he will probably,
over time, give up the desire to avoid frustration and suffering. Or,
alternately, s/he may be deprived of the knowledge that such a
function even exists, and therefore not articulate it in her/his set of
articulated preferences. 2 07 For example, Sen observes that, in
Perspective, in CAROLE MCCANN & SEUNG-KYUNG KIM, FEMINIST THEORY
READER: LOCAL AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES (2003).
203 See Paula England, The Separative Self: Androcentric Bias in Neoclassical
Economics, in BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN: FEMINIST THEORY AND ECONOMICS 37
(1993).2
°4As Kenneth Arrow's Impossibility Theorem makes clear, this is no easy
task-any non-dictatorial social preference ordering is problematic, violating the
most basic conditions of transitiveness and Pareto optimality. See Kenneth
Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (1963) (1951) and Wiley & Arrow,
A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare, 58 J. POL. ECON. 328-46 (1950).
205 See Sen, Gender and Cooperative Conflicts, supra note 194, at 123-49. See
also SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM, supra note 194; Amartya Sen, The
'Possibility of Social Choice, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 349-78 (1999).
206 See Anderson, supra note 198, at 245.
207 Id. at 244.
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surveys conducted in many poor countries, men are significantly
more likely to complain about poor health, even though medical
statistics show that it is the women in these countries who suffer
from greater morbidity and mortality.2 0 8 Quoting Anderson,
"Utility fails to measure deprivations to the extent that the poor
and downcast adapt to them or are ignorant of the possibilities. 2 °9
Second, utility-based preference evaluation may not give
sufficient weight to questions of agency and free choice. 2  That is,
even if two people have identical outcomes, if one chose that
outcome from a variety of possibilities while the other was forced
into that outcome for lack of real alternatives, the first person
expressed more agency, more choice, and was hence better-off.
Sen's vision of free choice differs considerably from the "freedom
to choose" of most neoclassical economists and liberal theorists,
who focus almost exclusively on freedom from government
"intervention. ' 2 11 For Sen, for a choice to be truly free, it must not
only occur in the context of a lack of legal prohibition, but also be
unconstrained by social coercion. For example, it may be
"unseemly" for women to go to school, or impossible because of
childcare or other household responsibilities. And choice must not
be constrained by poverty or by the lack of basic resources.
212
This belief in the importance of truly free choice,
unconstrained by social coercion and poverty as well as
government constraints, has led Sen to measure well-being and
208 Amartya Sen, Capability and Well-Being, in THE QUALITY OF LIFE 135
(Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen eds., 1993).
209 Anderson, supra note 198.
2 10 
id.
211 See Des Gasper & Irene can Staveren, Development as Freedom - and What
Else?, "9 FEM. ECON. 139 (2003).
212 See supra note 194. Note that equality of freedom of choice does not
necessarily imply absolute equality of resources; some people may have higher
need for resources to achieve the same level of functioning. Some of these
differences in needs may be biological; e.g., pregnant women need more protein
than non-pregnant women. But others may be social; e.g., women who are
considered to be responsible for childcare and elder care may require additional
social resources to achieve an education.
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evaluate social arrangements by "capabilities"; i.e., the set of
possible achievable functionings that a person or group is able to
accomplish, given his/her access to resources, and social and legal
constraints.
2 A
3. Positional differences as an informational resource
Many feminist philosophers agree with Sen that the
aggregation of individual preferences does not exhaust the domain
of social evaluation. 214 The plurality of social positions and
evaluative perspectives, rather than being a source or error or bias,
should be treated as an informational resource. It is the interaction
of these local perspectives, rather than their reduction or
elimination, which allows the construction of a more global, more
"universal," point of view.215
This respect for people's positional differences and the
necessity of dialogue to establishing knowledge underlies Sen's
"pragmatic-epistemic" approach, in which preferences are not
taken as fixed or given. 16 Rather, people's needs, aims, and
assessments cannot be divorced from public deliberation; from
213 See AMARTYA SEN, COMMODITIES AND CAPABILITIES (1985). Sen's
capabilities approach has been used to construct measures of development such
as the Human Development Index (HDI), which includes political freedoms (the
right to vote without interference, freedoms of speech and assembly, etc.),
measures of social development (percent literacy, infant mortality, etc.), as well
as traditional measures of economic progress (GDP per capita, etc.).
214 See, e.g., LINDA NICHOLSON, FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM (1990). See also
IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE (1990); Sandra
Harding, Rethinking Stendpoint Epistemology: What is Strong Objectivity?, in
FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGIES (Linda Alcoff & Elizabeth Potter, eds., 1993); Helen
Longino, Essential Tensions - Phase Two: Feminist, Philosophical, and Social
Studies of Science, in A MIND OF ONE'S OWN (Louise Antony & Charlotte Witt,
eds., 1993); Martha Nussbaum, Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements: Sen
and Social Justice, 9 FEMINIST ECON. 33 (2003).
215 See Fabienne Peter, Gender and the Foundations of Social Choice: The Role
of Situated Agency, 9 FEMINIST ECON. 13 (2003).216 See id. See also supra note 200, at 244-246.
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learning about other people's lives. 2 17
Furthermore, Sen believes that participatory democracy,
with its guarantees of civil liberties, press freedom, etc., is the
optimal system to utilize this positional information for shared
social ends. 2 18 Democracy is not merely aggregative, as it is in
utility-based social welfare theories. Rather, it is deliberate; it has a
constructive, informational function.
As an example, in some of his early work, Sen compared
how the market, and the political systems of post-colonial
democratic India and authoritarian China have dealt with the
problem of famine; in particular, how well each system obtained
and managed the information necessary to prevent this catastrophe.
219 Briefly, he concluded that aggregate declines in food
availability are not the fundamental cause of famine. Rather,
famine is caused by a severe decline in the entitlement of one or
more segments of the population; a decline in their command over
income or other means to acquire food.22 ° Markets suffer from
severe information deficits in dealing with this problem, as
preferences and needs are conveyed only through the price
mechanism, which is dependent on the widespread availability of
money. Particularly in areas where product and/or labor markets
are under-developed, the needs and desires of the poor may
register faintly, if at all.22' In other words, free markets, by
themselves, lack the information-generating and transmission
capacities necessary to prevent food disasters.
2 22
Similarly, despite what Sen believes to be the Chinese
government's desire to provide food security for the Chinese
people, the authoritarian Chinese system lacked the informational
and feedback mechanisms necessary to prevent a disaster in 1959-
1960. Without a free press, and with severe political disincentives
217 See Anderson, supra note 198.
218 id.
219 See Amartya Sen, Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and
Deprivation (1981).
220 See Anderson, supra note 198, at 246.22 1 See id. at 247.
222 See id
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to reporting what was actually happening in the rural areas, the
central Chinese government did not know what was happening
until it was too late to prevent widespread starvation.
223
Sen contrasts this situation to post-independence
democratic India where, despite low per capita incomes and
continuing deprivation, famine has been eradicated.224 When food
shortages arise, a free press brings the situation to public attention.
The resulting political pressure, which includes public protests by
civic and religious groups and by opposition political parties,
forces accountability of officials in the form of food distribution
programs. 225 Thus, the information-generating-and-transmitting
capacities of a democratically-elected government and a free press
are able to overcome the information deficits of the market and
prevent disaster.
It is this information-sharing, learning, and policy-
correction aspect of democracy that Sen finds so attractive.
Freedoms of the press and assembly, and the periodic democratic
election of officials, can allow the situation of disempowered
and/or deprived segments of the population to be brought to the
attention of the public. This new information can force a national
conversation on the problem(s) and force accountability from
government officials. Democracy is more than the aggregation of
individual, supposedly exogenous preferences; it is a constructive
information-sharing, learning, and accountability mechanism for
the population and office-holders alike. Public discourse can
change people's perceptions of their "needs" and their problems,
and of feasible solutions to those problems.
226
[T]he practice of democracy gives the citizens an
opportunity to learn from each other, and to re-
223 See Anderson, supra note 198, at 247-248.
224 See id. at 247.
225 See id. at 246-248.
226 See supra note 200, at 250. See also SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM, supra
note 194.
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examine their own values and priorities, along with
those of others. Even the idea of 'needs' (including
.the understanding of 'economic needs') requires
public discussion and exchange of information,
views and analyses. . . . Political rights and civil
rights, especially those related to the guaranteeing
of open discussion, debate, criticism, and dissent are
central to the process of generating informed and
reflected choices.
227
To be effective as an information-sharing and learning mechanism,
and to enable citizens to construct a more inclusive point of view,
the national conversation must include the voices of all segments
of society, including the traditionally disempowered,
disadvantaged, and disenfranchised. Many of the challenges of
modern democratic practice, including questions surrounding
campaign finance, center on this question of inclusion.
In sum, the law and neoclassical economics model of
democratic politics views citizens as passive consumers of
candidate and issue information, whose duties are limited to
determining which candidates optimize their pre-existing
preferences. For feminist economists, however, citizens are not
regarded as merely consumers of information. Rather, they are
viewed as active participants in deliberative democracy, in
dialogue with their fellow citizens so that they can share their
understandings and experiences and develop more global
understandings and better, more inclusive policies. More attack ads
will not fulfill these functions, no matter who pays for them.
Rather, we need to begin to consider more fundamental changes in
the American political/electoral system that could lead to the
inclusion of more voices in a truly national conversation.
FECA-type regulation from the top down may be necessary
to avoid quid pro quo corruption and/or the appearance thereof.
But the "deepening of democracy" that we need will require
227 See Sen, Gender and Cooperative Conflicts, supra note 194; see also IRENE
TINKER, PERSISTENT INEQUALITIES: WOMEN AND WORLD DEVELOPMENT 123-
48 (1990).
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empowerment from the bottom up. The expansion of "dialogic
sites" where equal citizens can meet each other for democratic
dialogue, and where empathetic cross-identification, new
understandings, and new policies can grow. 228 Unfortunately,
many of these vital sites are currently in decline.
VII. The Decline of Political Community in America
Revitalizing American democracy, then, is not just a matter
of providing better, low-cost information to individualized,
atomistic voters. It is also a matter of developing new "dialogic
sites" where people can share their experiences with their fellow
citizens. Only in community can we voice our concerns, set our
priorities, and begin the process of compromise necessary to solve
our problems.
In the remainder of this paper, we will very briefly explore
the reasons for the decline of some sites for community political
discussion and debate. We will look to recent participatory
political movements, such as feminism and the civil rights
movement, for insights into the development of political
community/dialogue. And, finally, we will examine some modest
proposals for the invigoration of America's national political
dialogue.
The Decline of Dialogic Sites
The last half of the twentieth century witnessed significant
decline in many of the organizations and spaces where Americans
once debated political issues. For example:
1. Political parties: Michael Fitts and other scholars have
documented the decline in the strength of the major American
political parties: " . . . party identification within the electorate and
party strength more generally have diminished, especially since the
1950s, with a majority of voters identifying themselves as either
228 See Anderson, supra note 198.
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independents or only loosely affiliated with a party."229  Fitts
argues that this decline in party identification is the primary factor
behind both the decreases in voter participation and the increasing
pro-market (and anti-egalitarian) orientation of much of American
politics. Many factors undoubtedly contributed to this decline in
Americans' identification with the major political parties; I will
mention three.
First, for the Democratic Party, this decline cannot be
disconnected from the decline of the union movement.230 At its
height, organized labor provided much of the Party's labor power
and political energy. Second, the 1972 McGovern-Fraser reforms,
which provided for the direct election of presidential nominees
through primary elections, were designed to reduce the influence
of "party bosses. ' 231 However, in the process, they also
dramatically reduced the operative functions of party delegates and
transformed the major party conventions into media-savvy
"coronations" instead of sites. for political debate.232 Third,
political parties, particularly on the state and local level, rely
heavily on the unpaid labor of thousands of volunteers - primarily
women - whose energies are increasingly drawn into paid work.233
Any analysis of the decline (and potential revitalization) of
grassroots party politics must take account of this crucial factor.
2. Labor unions: For many working class people, unions
and allied organizations were once the primary sites for political
education, places where economic and other issues would be
229 Michael Fitts, supra note 11.
230 See Stephen Lerner, An Immodest Proposal: A New Architecture for the
House of Labor, NEW LABOR FORUM, Summer 2003, at 9. See also David
Montgomery, Turning to the States: Comment on 'Labor vs. the Law: How the
Wagner Act Became a Management Tool' by David Brody, NEW LABOR FORUM,
Spring 2004, at 17-19 (providing a concise history of the positive and negative
aspects of the last hundred years of union history).
231 See THOMAS PATTERSON, THE VANISHING VOTER: PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT IN
AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY (2002).
232 Id.
233 See Anderson, supra note 198, at 246-248.
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raised, explored and debated.234 But with only 13.2% of the
American workforce currently organized, unions no longer
constitute a major national dialogic (or political) force.235 The
reasons for the decline of the American union movement are
complex, but certainly include capital flight and globalization, and
the anti-democratic errors of unions themselves, such as racism,
sexism, homophobia, anti-immigrant bias, and corruption. But one
significant factor is clearly the hostile state of American labor law
and regulation.
In 1935, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the
Wagner Act, 236 which guaranteed workers the right to bargain
collectively through "representatives of their own choosing,"
primarily through elections sponsored by the National Labor
Relations Board (hereinafter "NLRB").237 In NLRB v. Jones and
Laughlin Steel Co.,238 the Supreme Court affirmed the right to
organize as a "fundamental right" guaranteed by the freedom of
association.23 9 But decades of conservative legislation,240 case law,
and NLRB rulings have whittled away at that "fundamental right,"
until, in 2000, Human Rights Watch declared the United States to
234 In some working class communities, the rise of the evangelical church has
partly filled this need for social and community support formerly filled by the
union movement. However, the possibilities for political dialogue are often
severely curtailed in religious spaces, by the hierarchical nature of both the
institution and its dominant ideology.
235 See David Montgomery, supra note 230.
23641 U.S.C. § 46 (1935).
237The Wagner Act did not preclude other paths to union recognition; e.g., card-
check, petition, etc. But in 1974, the Supreme Court ruled that an employer was
absolved of the duty to bargain without an NLRB-sponsored election, provided
that that employer had not engaged in unfair labor practices "too egregious to
permit an election." NLRB v. Linden Lumber, 419 U.S. 301, 95 S.Ct. 429 (1974).
See also David Brody, Labor vs. the Law: How the Wagner Act Became a
Management Tool, NEW LABOR FORUM, Spring 2004, at 9-14.
238 332 U.S. 823, 68 S.Ct. 158 (1947).
239 Craig Becker, Elections Without Democracy: Reconstructing the Right to
Organize, NEW LABOR FORUM, Fall/Winter, 1998, at 97-109.
240 See, e.g., The Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1947).
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be in violation of international law and human rights standards for
failing to protect the rights of American workers to freely form
unions.
24 1
Given this hostile environment and the internal problems of
the labor movement, it is not surprising that labor unions now lose
the majority of NLRB-sponsored elections, and that the union
movement, in the past five years, has lost an average of over one-
hundred-thousand members annually.242 Stewart Acuff said, "...
241 See Stewart Acuff, Fifty Ways to Get to Yes: Comment on 'Labor vs. the
Law: How the Wagner Act Became a Management Tool' by David Brody, NEW
LABOR FORUM, March 2004, at 23-28. "Taft-Hartley" established the "free
speech rights" of employers to "participate" in union election campaigns. This
made it lawful for employers to force workers to sit through captive-audience
meetings, where they have to listen to anti-union speeches; according to a 1990
study, over 70% of employers hold such meetings during union campaigns. See
Craig Becker, supra note 241, at 101. "Taft-Hartley" made it legal for
employers to conduct one-on-one interviews with employees concerning their
views on unions; a study conducted by the AFL-CIO found that 91% of
employers conduct such sessions. See Dorothy Benz, Scaling the Wall of
Employer Resistance: The Case for Card Check Campaigns, NEW LABOR
FORUM, Fall/Winter 1998, at 127. Although it is technically illegal to fire
workers for their pro-union views or activities, this occurs regularly. A study
conducted by Kate Bronfenbrenner of Cornell found that 25% of private sector
employers had illegally fired at least one employee during an average organizing
drive. See Acuff, supra note 243, at 25. In addition, "Taft-Hartley" placed
severe restrictions on secondary boycotts (advocating that consumers not buy a
product from a recalcitrant employer) and on solidarity strikes (strikes by other
unions in support of an organizing drive or contract negotiations). See also
NLRB v Mackay Radio and Telegraph Co., 303 U.S. 630, 58 S.Ct. 644 (1938),
holding that, although employers could not legally fire strikers, they could
"permanently replace" them, leaving striking workers only the right to be
recalled should positions open up). See also David Brody, A Question of Rights,
NEW LABOR FORUM, Fall/Winter 1998, at 136 (noting that the court's ruling in
Mackey Radio makes it very difficult for workers to mount a credible strike
threat).
242 See Dan Clawson, We Shall Overcome: How the Civil Rights Movement Can
Inspire a New Labor Upsurge, NEW LABOR FORUM, 2003, Fall 2003, at 40
(noting that every year, unionized companies go out of business, leave the US,
or subcontract out their work to non-union shops. These processes alone
eliminate about 250,000 union jobs annually). Clawson goes on to say that, in
addition, the labor force grows every year. Thus, to maintain the same union
density, unions would have to sign up approximately 439,000 annually. Even
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the effects on our society of depriving workers of this fundamental
right are devastating: declining civic and political activity, a
steadily eroding retirement system, an ever-widening wage and
income gap, growing poverty, and a dangerous rightward drift of
our cultural and political life. '2 43 If the labor movement is going to
be reestablished as a major site for political dialogue, this hostile
legal and regulatory climate must be changed.
3. Civic organizations: Robert Putnam and others have
documented the decline in other American civic institutions, from
Lions' Clubs to bowling leagues. 244 Putnam believes that the
primary reason is the rise of television and the culture of
individualistic entertainment it fosters. While I disagree with
Putnam concerning the reasons for the erosion of these institutions,
they were certainly sites where informal political discussion and
debate occurred.24
Although it is true that television and related media may
have contributed to the atomization of Americans, I would argue
that a different set of factors is primarily responsible for the
decline in American civic institutions, including political parties.
Americans now have the longest workweeks, with more family
members in the workforce, than anywhere else in the industrialized
246
world.2 6 This is combined with a stunning lack of supportive
during the relatively liberal NLRB of the Clinton years, labor averaged total
organizing of 75,000 annually. See David Brody, supra note 237,
243 Stewart Acuff, supra note 241, at 25.
244 See ROBERT PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF
AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2001).
245 Id. I would argue that the rise of "television culture" is primarily a result,
rather than a cause, of these broader economic and social changes. As
workweeks grow and schedules become more complicated, it is increasingly
difficult to find common times for recreation with friends and family - most of
whom are also working longer hours. Individualized entertainment for
overworked and exhausted individuals may become the only realistic option.
246 See ANN CRITrENDEN, THE PRICE OF MOTHERHOOD: WHY THE MOST
IMPORTANT JOB IN THE WORLD IS STILL THE LEAST VALUED (2001). See also
Jared Bernstein, The Rise in Family Work Hours Leads Many Americans to
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services to help families and communities cope with the resulting
decline in unpaid caring labor. On-site childcare, humane and
affordable care for the elderly and disabled, flexible work
schedules, and paid maternity/paternity leave, are all things that
feminist economists have been demanding for years.247 In other
words, as an increasing percent of women have chosen, or been
forced by economic pressures, to trade unpaid labor for paid labor,
public institutions have not picked up the slack. The predictable
result has been a significant decrease in the amount of unpaid
caring labor going into not only individual families, but also into
community institutions from Scout troops to political parties.
Feminist economists, myself included, laud many of the
results of women's increased labor force participation rates,
including our increasing economic self-sufficiency, the increased
use of our talents and capabilities, and the increased possibility for
social and political equality. Nevertheless, as we fight for equality
in the workplace and the public sphere, we must simultaneously
fight for policies to mitigate the resulting "crisis in care" in our
families and communities.24 8 This is partly for reasons of self-
preservation.249 But ignoring the "care crisis" is also politically
unwise, as the (very real) deficit of labor inputs into families and
communities fuels the "family values" backlash against feminism,
and makes the struggle for political and economic equality that
Struggle to Balance Work and Family, Policy Institute, July 7, 2004, at
http://www.epinet.or2/content.cfm/webfeatures snapshots 07072004. See also
ELIZABETH WARREN &AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME TRAP: WHY
MIDDLE CLASS MOTHERS AND FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE (2003) (pointing out
that rising costs for housing, health insurance, day care, and transportation have
"eaten up" any increases in income resulting having two adults in the workforce;
the median American family is no better off financially -- and is possibly worse
off-- than thirty years ago).
247 See NANCY FOLBRE, THE INVISIBLE HEART: ECONOMICS AND FAMILY
VALUES (2001). See also Paula England and Nancy Folbre, Contracting for
Care, in FEMINIST ECONOMICS TODAY: BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN 61-80
(Marianne Ferber and Julie Nelson eds., 2003) 61-80.
248 See id.
249 See CRITTENDEN, supra note 246. A recent survey of young mothers found
that, on average, they were sleeping only five to six hours per night. Many were
sleeping only three to four.
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much more difficult.
This decline in non-market work and non-market values
has also had a major impact on American political culture. In an
increasingly mobile, hurried/harried, atomized and fragmented
world, citizens increasingly talk to each other about politics, if at
all, through the "national communications medium" of television.
Rather than using this medium to further alienate and atomize us,
perhaps we can use this medium to increase the interest in, and
sites for, national political dialogue. Can we use the tools of
modem technology to create, rather than undermine, political
discussion and political community? I believe that we can - by
learning from the feminist and civil rights movements; in
particular, from the civil rights movement's commitment to the
right of every American to participate in the political process, and
from feminism's insights regarding the co-creation of community
and knowledge.
Since the early days of the second wave of the women's
liberation movement, American feminists have relied upon a
community-based process of knowledge creation. This public,
consciousness-raising (hereinafter "CR") mode of knowledge
creation can serve as ari archetypal model for the co-creation of
knowledge and community necessary for political revitalization.
Given the priv~te nature of so much of women's experience and
oppression, the creation of feminist theory and feminist knowledge
has necessarily evolved from the shared consideration of our so-
called private experiences. Through sharing these private
experiences, women have found that our experiences weren't so
private after all. Rather, they were widespread and the result of the
quotidian functioning of discriminatory institutions and cultural
practices, from the lack of affordable childcare to the male
orientation of much of American medical research. 250
250 See, e.g., MARILYN FRYE, THE POLITICS OF REALITY: ESSAYS IN FEMINIST
THEORY (1983); Marilyn Frye, The Possibility of Feminist Theory, in ALISON
JAGGAR & PAULA ROTHENBERG, FEMINIST FRAMEWORKS: ALTERNATIVE
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Many feminists, myself included, have criticized the
limitations of this consciousness-raising mode of knowledge
production. 251 For one thing, the content of the knowledge created
depends critically upon "who is in the room"; i.e., whether those
included in 'the dialogue are sufficiently diverse as to race, class,
sexuality, and other axes of difference so that the experiences and
issues of varying groups of women will be represented and
theorized.2 52  However, despite its obvious short-comings,
feminists' early decentralized, grassroots mode of knowledge
production makes clear the extent to which the validation and
interpretation of experience, and the proposition of solutions to the
identified common problems, is necessarily a community activity,
a process of entering into an ongoing dialogue.
Consistent with Sen's theory of democratic participation,
women's CR groups, at their best, used women's differing
positions to educate and create empathy for one another, to identify
common experiences and problems, and to develop strategies for
change. And the culture of CR - of local groups of individuals
sharing their concerns and experiences and discussing possible
solutions - can perhaps give us direction as we attempt to revitalize
dialogic sites and American political culture.
VIII. Some Modest Proposals for Democratic Revitalization
So how can we apply the insights of the feminist movement
and other participatory movements to the recreation of dialogic
sites in the U.S. today? Can we take advantage of the capabilities
of modern communications technology for the dissemination of
information without increasing atomization? Despite our
increasing workloads and increasing isolation, are there steps we
can take to recreate viable dialogic and democratic sites for
THEORETICAL ACCOUNTS OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN MEN AND WOMEN 103-
10(1996).
251 Kimberly Christensen, 'With Whom Do You Believe Your Lot is Case?':
White Feminists and Racism, 22 SIGNS: J. WOMEN IN CULTURE & SOCIETY 617,
617-48 (1997).
252 Id. Other criticisms include the lack of long-run organizations which resulted
from the process and the difficulties of engaging in legislative lobbying and
other day-to-day politicking without such an organizational base.
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political participation?
The following are a few modest proposals (from the least to
the most ambitious) regarding democratic revitalization. They are,
by no means, definitive, but rather represent an attempt to
stimulate discussion on this vitally important topic.
1. Use technology to reduce information costs: Centralized
election websites
In a context where families have less and less time to
research candidates and positions, it is vital to reduce both the
direct and opportunity costs of procuring accurate political
information on candidates and issues. This could be accomplished
quite easily via a central FEC-sponsored election website, whose
existence could be advertised via brief public service
announcements on television. Each qualified candidate for federal
office would be allowed a statement of prescribed length to
introduce him/herself to the voters and to explain his/her positions
on the vital issues of the day. Linked chat rooms could be
provided for those who wish to discuss the candidates, and
candidates would be expected to maintain active email links from
these sites. Similarly, supporters or opponents of an upcoming
referendum or ballot question could be granted text space on the
website to advocate for their positions.
Where applicable, the site could contain easily-navigated
links to similar state and local websites, where state and local
candidates and issues could be similarly introduced. State and local
sites could also contain links to maps of election districts and
polling places, polling hours, and other helpful voter information.
Both federal and state/local websites should be linked to similar
sites in languages other than English. Local libraries and schools
could play a valuable role in assisting seniors, those with language
difficulties, those who cannot afford computers or internet access,
and anyone who is less-than-computer-savvy in the operation of
the website(s).
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An easily downloaded scorecard could be provided on the
site where candidates could record their views on pivotal issues,
e.g., "Do you support overturning Roe. v. Wade?" "Do you
support the continuation of the U.S. military presence in Iraq?"
The questions could be submitted by the candidate themselves, by
professional journalists, or preferably by an online poll of
registered voters.
Assuming reasonable navigability, such websites could
dramatically decrease the direct and indirect costs of accessing
electoral information, and would hopefully increase voter
education and participation, particularly among the more
computer-savvy young.
2. Change the electoral eco-system
Those of us who wish to reform the American electoral
process need to examine carefully the eco-system within which
U.S. elections occur. 253 Proposals for reform include those to
simplify the process of registration and voting, to update and
upgrade the technology of voting, to change the primary system, to
establish proportional and instant run-off voting, and to abolish the
Electoral College.
254
Simplify registration and voting
Proposals for improving this aspect of the eco-system
include simplifying voter registration (election-day and/or online
voter registration), extending polling hours and days (to include at
least one weekend day), providing short-term child-care at polling
places, experimenting with voting-by-mail, and otherwise making
it easier for those with long work hours and/or child and eldercare
responsibilities to vote. Such reforms can be moderately successful
in increasing voter participation, particularly among the less well-
educated and lower-income citizens. For instance, six states, Idaho,
Maine, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and Wyoming,
currently have same-day voter registration. 255 Their voter
participation rates, especially among young voters, now average
253 See Isaacharoff& Karlan, supra note 80, at 1705.
254 See id.
255 See PATTERSON, supra note 23 1.
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fifteen percent higher than the rest of the nation.256 In 2000, states
with polls that closed at 8:00 PM or later had turnout rates
averaging three percent higher than those with shorter hours.
257
Similarly, the 1993 "Motor Voter Act,, 258 which requires states to
offer voter registration at public assistance agencies and motor
vehicle offices, has had a moderately positive impact on
registration and participation. The FEC estimates that the Act has
added at least ten million new voters to the rolls.
259
Upgrade and update the technology of voting
The 2002 "Help Americans Vote Act"2 6° (hereinafter
"HAVA") was intended to address the voting machine errors and
ambiguities, racially biased felon purge lists, and other
irregularities in the 2000 elections. 261 However, as Tova Andrea
Wang points out, the 2004 election was also characterized by
numerous voting irregularities. 262 These ranged from the rejection
of voter registration forms in Ohio because they were printed on
the wrong weight of paper, to state-to-state inconsistencies in
counting provisional ballots,263 to scarcities of voting machines
256 See id.
257 Id. at 131.
25 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg (1993).
259 See PATTERSON, supra note 231, at 8.
260 42 U.S.C. § 15301 to 15545 (2002).
26 1 For instance, in 2000 in Florida, 22,000 Blacks, but only 6 Hispanics, were
purged from the voter registration rolls on account of felony convictions. This is
despite the approximately equal representation of these two racial/ethnic groups
among Florida's convicted felons. See also Tova Andrea Wang, The
Appearance of a Disaster Averted Obscures an Election System That's Still
Badly Broken, 16 AMER. PROSP. 1 (2005); Rebecca Perl, The Last
Disenfranchised Class, THE NATION, November 24, 2003, at
http://www.thenation.com/docprint.mhtml?i=20031124&s=perl.
262 See Wang, supra note 261.
263 See Counting of 2004 Provisional Ballots Varied Widely, Study Finds, N. Y.
TIMES, March 20, 2005, at A18 (citing a recent study by electionline.org, which
found enormous discrepancies in the ways states counted (or did not count)
provisional ballots (ballots which were cast when voters did not appear on the
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and unacceptably long waiting times, 264  to the (racially
disproportionate) "pre-emptive challenges" of 35,000 voters in the
swing state of Ohio.
265
The implementation in 2006 of two HAVA provisions, that
the states develop and maintain computerized voter registration
databases, and that all voting machines meet minimum standards
for technical reliability and accessibility, should solve some of
these problems. However, Congress needs to further clarify the
regulations for counting provisional ballots, and for voter
identification and felon exclusion in federal elections. In addition,
many observers believe that, given the polarization of the elections
and widespread suspicions regarding the "hackability" of touch-
screen machines, Congress should also mandate that all machines
leave a "paper trail" and be designed to allow independent post-
election audits and recounts. 266
Reform the primary system
Many observers, from the Republicans' Brock Commission
to the Democratic National Committee's Rules and Bylaws
Committee, have commented on the need to reform our primary
and candidate nomination system.267 The McGovern-Fraser
reforms of 1972 directed state parties to choose their convention
delegates through either primaries or caucuses open to all
registered party members. 268 As previously stated, they were
designed to reduce the power of party "bosses" and "put the voters
voter registration lists but believed they had the right to vote). For instance,
while Alaska counted 97% of its provisional ballots, Delaware counted just 6%.
264 There were vast discrepancies in the number of voting machines per capita,
often within a single county. For instance, at largely Democratic Kenyon
College in Ohio, there were two voting machines for 1300 registered voters.
Nearby, largely Republican areas, had one machine for every 100 registered
voters. See Joan Claybrook, Skeptics Ask: Did Bush Win Ohio? President's
View, PUBLIC CITIZEN NEWS, Jan./Feb., 2005.
265 See Wang, supra note 261.
266 See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Democracy at Risk, N. Y. TIMES, January 23, 2004,
at http://www.pkarchive.org (last visited on Apr. 3, 2006).
267 PATTERSON, supra note 231, at 148-149.
268 See id. at 104.
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in charge of the nominating process. ' 269 However, they have had
several unintended negative consequences. First, the current
primary system gives a disproportionate influence to voters in two
small, overwhelmingly white, rural states. Although the number of
delegates at stake in Iowa and New Hampshire is small, the
momentum, press attention, and subsequent fund-raising advantage
received by the victors in these states is considerable. Candidates
who appeal to urban and/or minority voters may not even surviie
these early contests. As Patterson says, "there are now two
different nominating elections, one formed by residents of early-
contest states and one consisting of residents of late-contest states.
The first electorate chooses the nominees and is more heavily
involved.
' 270
This disproportionate influence of voters in states with
early primaries has led to pressure to front-load the primaries and
to a bunching effect on Super Tuesday. Although a poorly-funded
candidate may be able to survive Iowa and New Hampshire
through intensive door-to-door campaigning and a strong volunteer
organization, s/he will have a very hard time competing effectively
in the dozen-or-so media-intensive primaries held simultaneously
on Super Tuesday.27' Says Patterson, "Super Tuesday is tailor-
made for well-funded candidates. Presidential hopefuls need to
raise a lot of cash up front to compete in today's front-loaded
system." 272 Some observers believe that the current, increasingly
front-loaded system also unnecessarily elongates the campaign,
making it harder for voters to maintain sustained attention to the
candidates and issues involved.
There are many competing proposals for primary reform.
They include a single, national primary election (the system
269 See id.
270 See id. at 112-113.
27! For example, note John McCain's early successes in the Iowa and New
Hampshire primaries for the 2000 presidential election, followed by his
overwhelming loss on Super Tuesday.
272 PATFERSON, supra note 23 1, at 114.
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favored by most Americans), randomly rotating the states'
primaries (to equalize voter influence over time), regional
primaries (to reduce candidate travel and expenses), the "Delaware
Plan" (an inverted pyramid system, with small states voting first),
and the "Patterson Plan" (several small state primaries to winnow
the field, followed by "Ultimate Tuesday," a de facto national
primary).273 In debating the pros and cons of the alternatives,
reformers should pay attention to equalizing the influence of voters
in the various states, to avoiding a process biased by race,
ethnicity, and/or rural/urban distinctions, and to minimizing the
influence of funding advantages in the decision-making process.
Investigate alternatives to "winner-take-all"
Proposals by Lani Guinier, Jonathan Levin and Barry
Nalebuff, and others for changing the U.S. winner-take-all
electoral system also deserve further investigation. 274 For example,
a voting system could give each voter multiple votes for each
office, allowing him/her to distribute them among the candidates as
s/he saw fit. If there were ten candidates for two senatorial seats, a
voter could give all of her, say, six votes to one strongly preferred
candidate, or distribute her six votes between two or three less-
strongly-preferred candidates. Other instant run-off systems could
give voters second choices; i.e., if your first-choice candidate
loses, your second choice is the one that is recorded. This system
could be particularly useful in preventing third-party candidates
from acting as spoilers.275 These and similar creative systems for
more closely matching preferences to outcomes are common in
corporate shareholder elections, non-profit corporate governance,
and many other venues. Research shows that such systems
generally have higher rates of both voter participation and voter
273 Id. at 153-155.
274 See supra note 148; Jonathan Levin & Barry Nalebuff, An Introduction to
Vote-Counting Schemes, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 1, 3-26 (1995). See also the
discussion pieces that follow the article.
275 See Steven Hill & Rob Richie, Despoiling the Election, THE NATION, Jul. 12,
2004, at 27-8 (proposing that states pass instant run-off voting measures to
prevent third party candidates from acting as "spoilers" in presidential
elections).
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satisfaction than winner-take-all systems such as our own.
2 7 6
Abolish the Electoral College
Finally, as the 2000 election demonstrated, the Electoral
College must be abolished and replaced with a system of direct
popular election of the president. Quoting Thomas Patterson, "[iun
what other democracy in the world would a [disputed] margin of
537 votes in one state be worth more than a nationwide margin of
537,179 votes?" 277 Such absurdities undermine faith not only in
individual office-holders, but in the legitimacy of the American
system.
3. Support egalitarian redistricting and confront racist
stereotyping to truly enfranchise people of color
As Terry Smith has pointed out, it is vitally important for
those of us who favor democratic reform to critically examine the
current deployment of race in American electoral politics. 278 Two
issues stand out: redistricting, and race-baiting in campaign
advertising. Even if electoral reforms succeed in equalizing
influence by those of differing incomes, African Americans and
other people of color can be easily de facto disenfranchised via
discriminatory redistricting. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
refused to grant judicial relief to African Americans whose voting
strength has been diluted by at-large elections or by redistricting
which dismantles "majority-minority" districts and divides the
votes of an African American community among predominantly
white districts. 279 Quoting Kenneth Cooper, "[these] legal
challenges to majority-minority districts seek to erase mostly Black
congressional districts, threatening three decades of gains made
276 See Levin, supra note 274.
277 PATTERSON, supra note 231, at 138.
278 Smith, supra note 109, at 1470-1522.
279 See Mobile, Alabama v. Boulden, 446 U.S. 55, 58 (1980) (refusing to grant
judicial relief to African Americans whose voting strength has been diluted by
at-large elections or by redistricting). See also Shaw, supra note 111.
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since the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. ' '28° Whatever
the campaign finance regime, discriminatory electoral regulations
can still make it very difficult for people of color to elect
representatives from their communities.
Second, as Smith and others have pointed out, it is also of
vital importance that egalitarian campaign reformers examine and,
where necessary, publicly criticize the derogatory representations
of people of color in much campaign rhetoric.2 1' This is
particularly true of the 30-second attack ads, where race-baiting
has become a depressingly familiar campaign ploy. From the
"Willie Horton" of George Bush Sr.'s campaign to Jesse Helm's
anti-affirmative action ads (which implied that whites are
unemployed because "an unqualified African American took your
job"), race has long been used to convince working- and middle-
class whites to blame their economic troubles not on wealthy elites
and policy-makers, but on stereotyped African Americans.2 82 In
other words, race-baiting has been used to convince working-class
whites to identify-up with rich whites rather than identify-across
with working- and middle-class Blacks.283 At least with respect to
white men, this strategy has unfortunately been largely successful,
and has convinced many working-class white men to vote against
what objectively, looks like their own economic interests.284 As
280 Kenneth Cooper, Dismantling Black Political Power, EMERGE: BLACK
AMERICA'S NEWSMAGAZINE. Apr. 1994, at 30. See also Voting Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1971 (1965).
281 See, e.g. Smith, supra note 109.
282 See id.
283 See DAN CARTER, FROM GEORGE WALLACE TO NEWT GINGRICH: RACE IN
THE CONSERVATIVE COUNTERREVOLUTION 1963-1994 (1996). See also
Kimberly Christensen, supra note 251; Paul Krugman, Flags Versus Dollars:
Why Howard Dean is Right, N.Y. TIMES, November 7, 2003 at 21; THOMAS
FRANK, WHAT'S THE MATTER WITH KANSAS? HOW CONSERVATIVES WON THE
HEART OF AMERICA (2004).284See Lois Weis, Race, Gender, and Critique: African-American Women, White
Women, and Domestic Violence in the 1980s and 1990s, 27 SIGNS: J. OF WOMEN
IN CULTURE & SOCIETY 139 (2001) (discussing the very different ways in which
working-class white men vs. white women conceptualize race; i.e., who they
hold responsible for their economic and neighborhood troubles. These
differences maybe at least partly responsible for the gender gap among white
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Smith points out, if the anti-egalitarian effects of this racial
stereotyping and scapegoating are not counteracted, they could
potentially blunt or even neutralize the egalitarian effects of other
campaign reforms.
285
4. Re-establish dialogic communities
Providing low-cost information about candidates and issues
via websites, simplifying the processes of registering and voting,
reforming the primary system, and similar changes could increase
political participation by overworked, harried Americans.
Similarly, reforming the primary system and abolishing the
Electoral College will make political outcomes more nearly reflect
voter preferences. In the long run, however, increasing
democratization will require the re-formation and revitalization of
dialogic sites; forums where ordinary citizens can publicly voice
their concerns and develop new heuristic frameworks through
which they can understand their common problems and possible
solutions. Proposals for creating dialogic sites include revitalizing
the American labor movement, and encouraging national political
dialogue via "mobile town meetings."
Re-establish dialogic communities: Revitalize the labor movement
Those who advocate a progressive agenda and wish to
revitalize American political debate cannot afford to overlook the
crucial role the labor movement has played historically in reducing
economic and political inequality. Numerous studies have shown
that the decline of union density in the U.S. since 1979 correlates
strongly with the growth of wage inequality during that same
period.286 Furthermore, international comparisons show a strong
voters). By "against their economic interests," I mean, for example, to vote for
candidates who oppose unions, oppose health and safety regulations, etc.
285 Smith, supra note 109, at 1492.
286 See David Card, The Effect of Unions on Wage Inequality in the US Labor
Market, 54 INDUSTRIAL &.LABOR RELATIONS REV. 354 (2001). See also Henry
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correlation between low union density and high wage inequality. 287
The labor movement has responded in two ways to the
current hostile legal and regulatory climate: by turning to "non-
board" (non-NLRB) strategies for union recognition such as "card-
check" authorization and neutrality agreements with employers,
288
and by calling for national labor law reform. One example of such
reform is the Employee Free Choice Act (hereinafter "EFCA"),
which would amend the National Labor Relations Act such that,
under ordinary circumstances, card check could replace an NLRB
election for purposes of union recognition and collective
bargaining.289  In addition, unfair labor practices during a
unionization campaign would be subject to injunctions and stiff
Farber, Nonunion Wage Rates and the Threat of Unionization (2002)
(unpublished Working Paper #472, Princeton University) (on file with author);
Lawrence Mishel & Matthew Walters, How Unions Help All Workers, Briefing
Paper (Economic Policy Institute, 2003) at
http://www.epinet.org/content.cfm/briefingpapers bp 143 (finding that over 20%
of the increasing wage gap is attributable to declining union density, and Farber
shows that "deunionization can explain as much as 50% of the growth in the
wage gap between workers with a college education and those with a high
school education."); Press Release, Alison Reardon, AFL-CIO, The Employee
Free Choice Act Will Guarantee Employee Free Choice Through Democratic
Majority Verification Procedures (2004) (stating that unions are particularly
important in terms of benefit coverage; unionized workers are 53% more likely
to have health insurance than nonunion workers.).
287 See David Card, Thomas Lemieux, & W. Craig Riddell, National Bureau of
Economic Research, Unionization and Wage Inequality: A Comparative Study
of the US, the UK, and Canada (2003) at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9473.
288 Under "card-check" authorization, the employer agrees to recognize the
union as the collective bargaining agent for the workers when a majority of
workers have handed in signed union authorization cards. By avoiding an NLRB
election, a "card-check" campaign avoids captive audience meetings, employee
interviews, and other anti-union tactics on the part of employers. "Card-check"
campaigns are often combined with "neutrality agreements"; i.e., the employer
agrees to remain neutral during the union campaign. UFCW (United Food and
Commercial Workers) has been somewhat successful with card check and
neutrality in the retail food industry, and HERE (Hotel and Restaurant
Employees) has been very successful in organizing Las Vegas casino and hotel
workers with these methods. See Benz, supra note 241, at 161.
289 This Act is cosponsored by Representative George Miller (D- CA),
Representative Peter King (R-NY), and Senator Edward Kennedy (D- MA).
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penalties, and mediation and arbitration would be made available
for negotiation of the first contract.2 90 Given the current congress
and president, supporters of EFCA find their success in the
immediate future to be highly unlikely, but they call for a process
of educating both Congress and the American public about the
current constraints to effective union organizing, and the need for
legal remedy.
291
However, if the labor movement is to provide sites for true
democratization, additional internal changes are needed. A labor
movement based on a top-down, undemocratic philosophy of
"business unionism" will never be successful in reigniting
organizing or democratic debate among American workers. As
with the broader electoral system, dissident unions and dissident
factions within unions must have access to resources - membership
lists, money from union dues, equal space in newsletters - to
adequately communicate with union members and potential
members. This internal democracy must be enforced, if necessary,
through governmental oversight and regulation.
292
290 See David Brody, supra note 237, at 9-19. See also Peter Olney, National
Reform, No Less: Comment on 'Labor vs. the Law: How the Wagner Act
Became a Management Tool' by David Brody, NEW LABOR FORUM, Spring
2004 at 21 (stating that other proposals include criminal penalties for employers'
unfair labor practices, and giving workers and unions legal standing to sue for
monetary damages; the same right that employers now enjoy under Taft-
Hartley).
291 In fact, in the short term, it may be necessary to defeat a proposal by
Representative Norwood (Republican of Georgia) to outlaw card check as a
union recognition mechanism.
292 As Mike Parker points out, the more democratic unions are often more
successful at gaining public support and winning contracts. Witness, for
example, the successful 1998 UPS strike. "An important reason for the
Teamsters' victory was that, before the UPS strike, the unions had been partially
transformed by a struggle to make it democratic [by the TDU, Teamsters for a
Democratic Union]. Democracy, it turned out, was not just the icing on the cake,
but the very foundation of union power in a critical struggle against a
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Finally, if the American labor movement is to attain its
potential as a site for democratic debate and political power, other
internal changes are needed.
Quoting Bill Fletcher and Richard Hurd:
If unions hope to attract a mass influx of new
members, they must first address seriously the
internal transformation required to build a labor
movement of all working people. The highest
priority should be on creating a culture of inclusion.
We envision a movement that embraces, attracts,
and promotes women, people of color, immigrants,
and lesbians and gays.
293
This internal transformation must begin by seriously coming to
terms with the complicated, contradictory, and sometimes
shameful history of organized labor's treatment of people of color,
immigrants, and/or of women. Incidents range from the refusal of
the AFL to admit the all-Black Brotherhood of Sleeping Car
Porters to the CIO's abandonment of "Operation Dixie" 294 to the
paltry amount of resources historically devoted to organizing
women workers and/or workers of color. 95
Kelley and others suggest that a serious grappling with this
history would push the labor movement in the direction of "social
corporation. Democracy turned the UPS membership from a passive group
conducive to scabbing into a strongly united organization of members able to
take initiative in the workplace and in the community." See Mike Parker,
Appealing for Democracy, NEW LABOR FORUM, Winter/Fall 1998, at 57.
293 Bill Fletcher & Richard Hurd, Is Organizing Enough? Race, Gender, and
Union Culture, NEW LABOR FORUM, Spring/Summer 2000, at 60. See also
Robin D.G. Kelley, Building Bridges: The Challenge of Organized Labor in
Communities of Color, NEW LABOR FORUM, Fall/Winter 1999, at 42 (noting
that, by the mid-1990s, white men constituted a minority of American union
members).
294 Operation Dixie was a 1950s multiracial organizing campaign in the South,
which held the potential to change the face of southern - and national - politics.
295 With respect to women, see, e.g., Alice Kessler-Harris, Where are the
Organized Women Workers?, in US WOMEN IN STRUGGLE: A FEMINIST STUDIES
ANTHOLOGY, 110 (Claire Moses & Heidi Hartmann, eds.,1995). With respect to
people of color, see Robin D.G. Kelley, supra note 293, at 48-50.
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unionism"; towards a vision of a labor movement working in
alliance with a myriad of community-based organizations for
social and economic justice.296 As Angela Glover Blackwell and
Kalima Rose have said, "labor must recognize the rich fabric of
organizations and institutions that support [low-income]
communities and that share labor's reform agenda."2 97 Such
coalitions, they believe, could open up the possibility of a
revitalized union movement, committed to inclusion and
democratic debate, which could once again be a significant
political force in American politics.
298
Re-establish dialogic communities: "Mobile town meetings" (or
"Reality TV meets electoral politics')
Since 1987, in the October of every presidential election
year, the Commission on Presidential Debates (hereinafter "CPD")
has sponsored presidential debates between the candidates of the
major parties. These debates, which feature questions from
professional journalists and some back-and-forth between the
candidates, do provide important information to potential voters.
However, they are often viewed as staid, "inside the Beltway"
affairs among the "chattering classes." More importantly, they do
nothing to foster a sense of participation and involvement by
ordinary citizens. Instead of traditional debates, I propose that the
CPD begin to organize and subsidize a series of weekly, nationally
televised "mobile town meetings" in the three months prior to any
federal election.
299
296 See Kelley, supra note 293, at 48-50.
297 See Angela Glover Blackwell & Kalima Rose, Overcoming the Obstacles:
Forging Effective Labor-Community Alliances, NEW LABOR FORUM,
Fall/Winter 1999, at 63 (urging organized labor to work in coalition with these
organizations; e.g., lending unions' technical and financial expertise to CBO's
(community-based organizations) in return for support for labor's organizing
and legal/political initiatives).
298 Id.
299 Over time, I would hope that the national CPD would spawn state
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The sites for these town meetings would be determined by
the CPD, with attention given to a mixture of rural vs. urban sites,
and an eye on racial, and other, diversity. Questions would come
not from professional journalists, but from ordinary citizens whose
names had been drawn randomly from the voter registration rolls
and who had been notified in advance by postcard. (Note that this
would give people an additional incentive to register to vote.)
Each candidate would open with a five-minute statement, and then
the floor would be open for three-minute questions or statements
from the randomly chosen citizens, with the candidate(s) given an
additional three minutes to respond.
Although the town meetings would be aired during prime
time, it is unclear whether any public financing, would be
necessary. It is quite possible that broadcasters would be able to
sell sufficient advertising time to cover the cost of these (probably
very non-boring!) gatherings. If this is not the case, then the FCC
could invoke pay-or-play as discussed above, i.e., enforce "must
carry" regulations or pay for the airtime through the revenues
generated from the auction of the digital spectrum. In either case,
minimal public monies would be involved.
Undoubtedly, some of the questions asked at these
meetings will be silly (of the "boxers or briefs?" variety), and some
participants may not ask questions at all, but rather, spend their
time haranguing one or more candidates/officeholders, as is their
right. But many of the questions will be serious, reflecting the
experiences and heartfelt concerns of ordinary Americans. Over
time, their questions could open up the range of issues discussed
and solutions considered in future debates and in the media. The
candidates' initial statements, given for free on prime time
television, could serve as a powerful antidote to the attack ads of
our mud-slinging electoral culture. (Why spend millions of dollars
on a misleading attack ad when your opponent gets five minutes -
free - to refute you?) And, over time, the possibility of public
Commissions on Senate and House Debates, which could sponsor similar
"mobile town meetings" around the states featuring senatorial and congressional
candidates.
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humiliation on prime time television could begin to serve as a
powerful tool for accountability among our elected officials.
Finally, the possibility, or reality, of participating in these
grassroots town meetings could serve as a powerful incentive for
political dialogue and debate in local communities - whether or not
they are sponsoring a meeting that electoral season. For once, we
could use the modem communications media not to divide and
atomize us, but to bring us together in genuine democratic
dialogue.
The particular proposals to increase dialogue and
participation are, of course, open to debate. But it is clear that
those of us who are interested in increasing the democratic nature
of American politics must begin to think more imaginatively than
just "who pays for the attack ads?" We must begin to use the tools
of modem communications technology, the insights we have
gained from the feminist, civil rights, and other participatory
political movements, and our understandings of feminist
economics to create possibilities for genuine citizen involvement
and genuine democratic community.
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